Explaining Perceptual Entitlement

Abstract

This paper evaluates the prospects of

Intentionalism, defeasibility, and justification

“…Help is only forthcoming if we allow no other properties besides appearance properties in the content of experience. 33 30 Sympathies with putting subjective appearance properties into the contents of experience are expressed by, among others, Egan 2006, who suggests understanding them as "centering features", Antony 2011, andmyself (2009;2012). 31 Philosophers thinking that experience represents objective, but situation-dependent properties include Harman 1990, Tye 1995, Noë 2004, Schellenberg 2007Schellenberg 2008, andBrogaard 2010.…”

Epistemic Entitlement

“…17. Nicholas Silins (2012), surprisingly, reads Burge as embracing no internalist requirement whatsoever: '[Burge's picture] allows that a suitable blindsighted subject can be as warranted in her "perceptual beliefs" as we are warranted in our perceptual beliefs. As long as her perceptual states are individuated and reliable in the right way, without any defeaters in play, her perceptual beliefs will be warranted, despite her lack of visual consciousness' (p. 9).…”

Vahid,Burge, and Perceptual Entitlement

“…Burge says, "If the reliability of a perceptual representation is not grounded in the individuation and nature of the state, then reliability cannot yield entitlement"(2003a, 532). For further discussion on how reliability must be grounded according to the Burgean account, seeBrueckner 2007 andSilins 2012. 327 VAHID, BURGE, AND PERCEPTUAL ENTITLEMENT © 2014 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd…”