Intentionalism, defeasibility, and justification

Glüer, Kathrin

doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0538-6

Cited by 4 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 43 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…37 As Moretti also points out, those worrying about the compatibility of dogmatism with Bayesianism implicitly avoid this problem by indeed construing the incoming proposition as a belief content: White (2006), for instance, uses (E) (E) It appears to me that this is a hand, where (E) is interpreted as about experience. As I have pointed out elsewhere, this move does comply with the difference requirement, but at the price of making introspection, not perception, the source of (the supposedly immediate) justification (Glüer 2016b). Moreover, it is not at all obvious that, or why, we should think that I have hands and the introspective proposition It appears to me that I have hands have identical justificatory profiles (Moretti 2015a, p. 273).…”

Section: Bayesianism Skepticism and Immediacymentioning

confidence: 90%

“…And on that interpretation, it is pretty clearly the case that o looks F probabilifies o is F. That is, the conditional probability of o's being F on o's looking F is (equal or) higher than the prior probability of o's being F (cf. Glüer 2014Glüer , 2016b.…”

Section: Experiential Reason Providingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A main part of the argument is that construing experience as a kind of belief makes it comparatively easy to accommodate its reason providing role (Glüer 2009). I have also argued that if experience is to be a propositional justifier providing defeasible reasons, its content is best construed as different from P-belief content (Glüer 2016b). Meeting this "difference requirement" at the same time allows us to escape the classical knockdowns for belief theories of experience, as these invariably, if implicitly, are premised on the same content assumption (cf.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Defeating looks

Glüer

2016

Synthese

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In previous work, I have suggested a doxastic account of perceptual experience according to which experiences form a (peculiar) kind of belief: Beliefs with what I have called "phenomenal" or "looks-content". I have argued that this account can not only accommodate the intuitive reason providing role of experience, but also its justificatory role. I have also argued that, in general, construing experience and perceptual beliefs, i.e. the beliefs most directly based on experience, as having different contents best accounts for the defeasibility of experiential reasons. In this paper, I shall have a closer look at the evidential or inferential relation between looks-propositions and the contents of perceptual beliefs and argue for a form of what I shall call "Pollockianism" about experiential reasons: such reasons are good unless defeated. Questions to be investigated include: Does the resulting picture of perceptual justification contain an externalist element? Is it compatible with Bayesianism? And how does it do with respect to problems that have been raised for other forms of Pollockianism such as dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism?

show abstract

Section: Bayesianism Skepticism and Immediacymentioning

confidence: 90%

Section: Experiential Reason Providingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Defeating looks

Glüer

2016

Synthese

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Our suggestion here, and the motivation for it, is modeled on Glüer's account of the content and justificatory role of perceptual experiences (see e.g. Glüer, 2009Glüer, , 2016. Resistance to sensory evidence, if any, could usefully be modeled on this account, too.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge Resistance in High-Choice Information Environments

Strömbäck¹,

Wikforss²,

Glüer³

et al. 2022

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This book offers a truly interdisciplinary exploration of our patterns of engagement with politics, news, and information in current high-choice information environments. Putting forth the notion that high-choice information environments may contribute to increasing misperceptions and knowledge resistance rather than greater public knowledge, the book offers insights into the processes that influence the supply of misinformation and factors influencing how and why people expose themselves to and process information that may support or contradict their beliefs and attitudes.A team of authors from across a range of disciplines address the phenomena of knowledge resistance and its causes and consequences at the macro-as well as the micro-level. The chapters take a philosophical look at the notion of knowledge resistance, before moving on to discuss issues such as misinformation and fake news, psychological mechanisms such as motivated reasoning in processes of selective exposure and attention, how people respond to evidence and fact-checking, the role of political partisanship, political polarization over factual beliefs, and how knowledge resistance might be counteracted.This book will have a broad appeal to scholars and students interested in knowledge resistance, primarily within philosophy, psychology, media and communication, and political science, as well as journalists and policymakers.

show abstract

“…151-152). 6 Including Macpherson (2011), Schellenberg (2013), Brogaard (2015), Glüer (2016), and Byrne (2016). 7 Perceived objects and properties are sometimes referred to as the 'content' of experience, but this terminological idiosyncrasy is beside the point.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Property-Perception Entail the Content View?

Wilson

2022

Erkenn

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Visual perception is widely taken to present properties such as redness, roundness, and so on. This in turn might be thought to give rise to accuracy conditions for experience, and so content, regardless of which metaphysical view of perception one endorses. An influential version of this argument —Susanna Siegel’s ‘Argument from Appearing’ — aims to establish the existence of content as common ground between representational and relational views of perception. This goes against proponents of ‘austere’ relationalism who deny that content plays a substantive role in philosophical explanations of conscious perceptual experience. Though Siegel’s argument purports to be neutral with respect to the metaphysics of perception, it relies upon an equivocation between the presentation of property-types and property-instances. Consequently, the argument begs the question against the austere relational view, and so fails to establish the desired conclusion. So while relationalists can and should allow that experiences have accuracy conditions, it does not follow from this that they have contents of any philosophically interesting or significant kind.

show abstract

Intentionalism, defeasibility, and justification

Cited by 4 publications

References 43 publications

Defeating looks

Defeating looks

Knowledge Resistance in High-Choice Information Environments

Does Property-Perception Entail the Content View?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About