Intentions and interactive transformations of decision problems

Abstract

In this paper I study two ways of transforming decision problems on the basis of previously adopted intentions, ruling out incompatible options and imposing a standard of relevance, with a particular focus on situations of strategic interaction. I show that in such situations problems arise which do not appear in the single-agent case, namely that transformation of decision problems can leave the agents with no option compatible with what they intend. I characterize conditions on the agents' intentions which avoid such problematic scenarios, in a way that requires each agent to take account of the intentions of others.

A dynamic-epistemic hybrid logic for intentions and information changes in strategic games

“…I have completely axiomatized [913] 312 Synthese (2009) 171:291-320 this system and used it to further the work on intention-based transformation of decision problem initiated by van Hees and Roy (2008) and Roy (2009), by answering four questions left open by their approach. All in all, I have provided a framework that merges insights from and contributes to three strong traditions in the study of rational agency: dynamic epistemic logic, epistemic game theory and philosophy of action.…”

“…I have answered four questions left open by van Hees and Roy (2008) and by Roy (2009). I first showed that cleaning corresponds to a public announcement of "intention-rationality" under common knowledge of intentions.…”

“…In this section I apply DL GF and its associated logic DL GF to generalize the investigation of van Hees and Roy (2008) and Roy (2009) 2.1 Cleaning as public announcement of "Intentions-Rationality" Van Hees and Roy (2008; define the cleaning operation as a tool for the formal study of the way intentions impose a "filter of admissibility" on the options in a given decision problem, a phenomenon which has attracted much attention in the philosophical literature since the work of Bratman (1987). The idea behind cleaning is that an agent should discard from a given deliberation all the options which would rule out the achievement of his intentions.…”

“…Philosophers of action have also repeatedly pointed out that intentions bring in a specific dynamic in deliberation. They induce transformations of decision problems by filtering the set of options, and by triggering deliberation on means (Bratman 1987;Bratman et al 1988;Roy 2009). …”

“…I provide a complete axiomatization for this logical system and use it to further the investigation set out in (van Hees and Roy 2008) and (Roy 2009) on the role of intentions in strategic interaction. I answer four questions that have been left open in these earlier two papers.…”