Inter-regional competition and quality in hospital care

Aiura, Hiroshi

doi:10.1007/s10198-012-0396-5

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Given the presence of firms owned by national and regional governments in many industries, the insights behind the paper can be incorporated into the analysis of different industries, e.g. the airport sector (Albalate et al (2012) and Matsumura and Matsushima (2012)), the broadcasting market (Bel and Domènech (2009) and González-Maestre and Martínez-Sánchez (2010), hospital markets (Brekke et al (2008), Aiura and Sanjo (2010) and Aiura (2013)), the university system (De Fraja and Valbonesi (2012) and Cremer and Maldonado (2013)), and the development of public facilities (Takahashi (2004)) among others.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, they omit firms owned by regional governments that are concerned only for the social welfare of their regions. However, such firms are present in many sectors: the airport sector (Albalate et al (2012)), the broadcasting market (Bel and Domènech (2009)), hospital markets (Aiura (2013)), the university system (De Fraja and Valbonesi (2012)), the development of public facilities (Takahashi (2004)), etc. My model incorporates regional public firms and analyzes the strategic interaction between them, the government of the country to which they belong and private owners.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Privatization Policies by National and Regional Governments

Martínez‐Sánchez

2021

Int. Game Theory Rev.

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In order to analyze the privatization policies undertaken by the national and regional governments, I consider a horizontal differentiation model with price competition in which a country consists of two regions of different sizes. I show that public-sector intervention by either the national or regional government is essential for achieving the social optimum. The preferences of consumers and firms about privatization policy are completely opposite: consumers prefer a regional public-sector intervention, while firms prefer a national public-sector intervention. Finally, I find that the preferences of the two regions about market structures are also opposite: the least populated region prefers the private duopoly, while the most populated region prefers a government intervention in the market.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Privatization Policies by National and Regional Governments

Martínez‐Sánchez

2021

Int. Game Theory Rev.

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“…1 Also, it might be possible that the decision of a certain local government affects those of 1 Many previous studies on mixed oligopoly have considered that public firms are owned by central governments which maximize the social welfare of their countries. But there are many sectors where firms are owned by local governments that are concerned only for the social welfare of their regions: the broadcasting market (Bel and Domènech 2009), hospital markets (Aiura 2013), the university system (De Fraja and Valbonesi 2012), the development of public facilities (Takahashi 2004), etc. the governments in other regions. Then, will it be socially desirable for the central government to uniformly advance privatization from a viewpoint of a nationwide welfare to all public firms?…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic behaviors on privatization between regions

Lee

2018

Asia-Pac J Reg Sci

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In this paper, focusing on the policy initiatives between the central government and local governments, we analyze the privatization policies in a mixed oligopoly model composed of two regions. The main results are as follows. First, in the case of centralized regime, partial privatization is socially desirable if the substitutability between goods is relatively high; if not, full nationalization is socially desirable. In the case of decentralized regime, local governments take partial privatization in the equilibrium irrespective of substitutability. However, the local governments tend to lower the partial privatization rate of public firms as the substitutability between goods increases. Second, the central government is more (resp. less) aggressive for privatization than the local governments when the substitutability is higher (resp. lower) than the critical level. This shows that the argument in Han and Ogawa (FinanzArchiv Public Financ Anal 64(3):352-363, 2008) is justifiable under certain conditions. Finally, decentralization brings forth an increase (resp. a decrease) in market size and consumer surplus if the substitutability is higher (resp. lower) than the critical level. However, the social welfare necessarily decreases by the decentralization for any levels of substitutability.

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Spatial Competition Models in Health Care Markets: A Review

Levaggi,

Levaggi

2024

Rev Ind Organ

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Through time, spatial competition has become the natural environment for studying a number of problems, ranging from product differentiation to mail order versus traditional business, to service provision under various assumptions about the institutional setting. Health economics research has greatly benefited from the intuitions that underlie the Hotelling model and several authors have contributed to the literature on the architecture of the market for health care by proposing models within this framework. In this paper we explore how spatial competition has been used in health economics to improve the knowledge of the mechanisms of the market for health care through the derivation of significant policy implications. One of the most important messages is that in spite of competition, the regulator still should have a central role in the architecture of the market and policies have to be carefully tailored in order to avoid the onset of perverse, undesired effects on quality and welfare.

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Inter-regional competition and quality in hospital care

Cited by 6 publications

References 24 publications

Privatization Policies by National and Regional Governments

Privatization Policies by National and Regional Governments

Strategic behaviors on privatization between regions

Spatial Competition Models in Health Care Markets: A Review

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