Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWithin the framework of spatial tax competition with cross-border shopping, we examine the choice of tax method between ad valorem tax and unit (specific) tax. The paper shows that governments endogenously choose ad valorem tax not because of a classic welfare reason, but because it is a good strategy in competing for mobile customers. Another key finding is that while governments are committed to the ad valorem tax method, the choice is not efficient; Tax-cutting competition becomes more serious when countries adopt ad valorem tax, and competition in ad valorem tax yields smaller payoffs than competition in unit tax.

We analyze a duopolistic health care market in which a rural public hospital competes against an urban public hospital on medical quality, by using a Hotelling-type spatial competition model extended into a two-region model. We show that the rural public hospital provides excess quality for each unit of medical service as compared to the first-best quality, and the profits of the rural public hospital are lower than those of the urban public hospital because the provision of excess quality requires larger expenditure. In addition, we investigate the impact of the partial (or full) privatization of local public hospitals.

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This study analyzes the effect of episode-of-care payment and patient choice on waiting time and the comprehensive quality of hospital care. The study assumes that two hospitals are located in two cities with different population sizes and compete with each other. We find that the comprehensive quality of hospital care as well as waiting time of both hospitals improve with an increase in payment per episode of care. However, we also find that the extent of these improvements differs according to the population size of the cities where the hospitals are located. Under the realistic assumptions that hospitals involve significant labor-intensive work, we find the improvements in comprehensive quality and waiting time in a hospital located in a small city to be greater than those in a hospital located in a large city. The result implies that regional disparity in the quality of hospital care decreases with an increase in payment per episode of care.

This study develops an overlapping generations model that involves the endogenous determination of demographic and city structure to fully analyze the social and natural changes in city populations. We provide conditions under which the model exhibits the spatial features of demography observed in urban areas: city centres have a lower total fertility rate than suburbs and larger cities have a lower total fertility rate than smaller cities. Through calibration, we also show that spatial factors have a significant impact on demographic characteristics and city growth.