Interactions between inferential strategies and belief bias

Markovits, Henry; Chantal, Pier-Luc de; Thompson, Valerie A.

doi:10.3758/s13421-017-0723-2

Cited by 25 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…They showed evidence of sensitivity to logical structure under response deadline and under free responding consistent with a dual route to logical judgments (rule-based). Interestingly, they also showed sensitivity to counterexample availability under speeded task suggesting that associative beliefs were available through type-1 processing, a finding consistent with dual route accounts of reasoning (Markovits, Brisson, de Chantal, & Thompson, 2017). Their findings suggest that reasoners are intuitively sensitive to logical and probabilistic information (Route 1) but when given more time to reflect on their responses, the ability to discriminate between valid and invalid inferences improves, as evidence for slower, rule-based processing (Route 2).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 53%

The logic sense: exploring the role of executive functioning in belief and logic-based judgments

Howarth

Handley

Walsh

2018

Thinking & Reasoning

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The Default Interventionist account suggests that by default, we often generate belief-based responses when reasoning and find it difficult to draw the logical inference. Recent research, however, shows that in some instances belief judgments take longer, are more prone to error and are more affected by cognitive load. One interpretation is that some logical inferences are available automatically and require intervention in order to respond according to beliefs. In two experiments, we investigate the effortful nature of belief judgments and the automaticity of logical inferences by increasing the inhibitory demands of the task. Participants were instructed to judge conclusion validity, believability and either font colour or font style, to increase the number of competing responses. Results showed that conflict more strongly affects judgments of believability than validity and when inhibitory demands are increased, the validity of an argument impacts more on belief judgments. These findings align with the new Parallel Processing model of belief bias.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 53%

The logic sense: exploring the role of executive functioning in belief and logic-based judgments

Howarth

Handley

Walsh

2018

Thinking & Reasoning

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“…Markovits and colleagues (Markovits, Brisson, & de Chantal, 2015, 2017aMarkovits, Brisson, de Chantal, & Thompson, 2017b;Markovits, Brunet, Thompson, & Brisson, 2013;Markovits, Lortie Forgues, & Brunet, 2012) have provided evidence that people have access to two types of inferential strategies when making judgments of logical validity, which map onto the basic mechanisms described by probabilistic (e.g., Evans, Over, & Handley, 2005;Oaksford & Chater, 2007) versus mental model (Barrouillet, Gauffroy, & Lecas, 2008;Johnson-Laird, 2001;Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991, 1992Markovits & Barrouillet, 2002) theories. This integrative model was built following the work initiated by d'Ydewalle (2005a, 2005b).…”

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confidence: 99%

Who resists belief-biased inferences? The role of individual differences in reasoning strategies, working memory, and attentional focus

et al. 2019

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A common explanation for individual differences in the ability to draw rule-based inferences, when a putative conclusion suggests a competing belief-based inference, is that the ability to do so depends on working memory capacity. In the following studies, we examined the hypothesis that the ability to draw rule-based inferences in belief bias tasks can also be explained by individual differences in reasoning strategies and in the related attentional focus. The dual-strategy model differentiates counterexample and statistical strategies that involve different information-processing styles. In the first study (N = 139), participants completed a working memory task (operation span), a strategy diagnostic questionnaire, and a belief bias task. The results showed that individual differences in strategy use predicted performance in the belief bias problems over and above any effects of working memory capacity, with counterexample reasoners producing rule-based inferences more often than statistical reasoners. In the second study (N = 196), an eye-tracking methodology was used as a process-tracing technique to investigate attentional differences between the two strategies. On problems showing a conflict between rule-based and belief-based information, counterexample reasoners demonstrated longer fixation times on the premises than did statistical reasoners, thus providing direct evidence that individual differences in strategy use reflect different processing styles. These results clearly indicate that individual differences in strategy use are an important determinant of the way that people make inferences when rule-based and belief-based cues are both present.

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“…The dual-strategy model predicts a greater tendency to base responses on conclusion believability when a statistical strategy is used, because beliefs can drive likelihood assessments of conclusion. Across three different forms of reasoning, effects of conclusion belief were observed to be stronger for statistical strategies, compared to counterexample strategies (Markovits et al, 2017). Belief bias was stronger with probabilistic strategies, but was not eliminated among those using counterexample strategies.…”

Section: The Dual-strategy Modelmentioning

confidence: 87%

“…Support for the dual-strategy model of reasoning derives from a series of studies conducted by Markovits and colleagues (e.g. Markovits, Brisson, & de Chantal, 2015a, 2015b, 2016Markovits, Brisson, de Chantal, & Singmann, 2018;Markovits, Brisson, de Chantal, & Thompson, 2017;Markovits, Brunet, Thompson, & Brisson, 2013;Markovits, Lortie Forgues, & Brunet, 2012) which provide strong evidence for the distinction between counterexample and statistical strategies. Markovits et al (2012) developed a method to distinguish between these reasoning strategies, by presenting problems accompanied by statistical information that described the likelihood of the putative conclusion.…”

Section: The Dual-strategy Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mental Models or Probabilistic Reasoning or Both

Beeson

Stupple

Schofield

et al. 2019

Psihol. teme (Online)

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The present paper presents an overview of contemporary reasoning research to examine the evidence for and implications of the Dual Strategy Model of Reasoning. The Dual Strategy Model of Reasoning proposes that there are two types of reasoning strategy applied in deductive reasoning - counterexample and statistical. The paper considers Mental Models Theory and The Probability Heuristics Model as candidate specifications for these respective strategies and hypotheses are proposed on this basis. The Dual Strategy Model is further considered in the context of Dual Process theory, the Dual Source Model and Meta-reasoning and implications of the synergy between these proposals are considered. We finally consider the Dual Strategy Model in the context of individual differences, and normative considerations before proposing novel hypotheses and further avenues of research which we argue require exploration in this context.

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Interactions between inferential strategies and belief bias

Cited by 25 publications

References 46 publications

The logic sense: exploring the role of executive functioning in belief and logic-based judgments

The logic sense: exploring the role of executive functioning in belief and logic-based judgments

Who resists belief-biased inferences? The role of individual differences in reasoning strategies, working memory, and attentional focus

Mental Models or Probabilistic Reasoning or Both

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