2022
DOI: 10.1287/moor.2020.1119
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Interactive Information Design

Abstract: We study the interaction between multiple information designers who try to influence the behavior of a set of agents. When each designer can choose information policies from a compact set of statistical experiments with countable support, such games always admit subgame-perfect equilibria. When designers produce public information, every equilibrium of the simple game in which the set of messages coincides with the set of states is robust in the sense that it is an equilibrium with larger and possibly infinite… Show more

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Cited by 11 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…Finally, this paper is closely related to the literature on Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)). A number of articles that include Au and Kawai (2020), Kamenica (2016, 2017), Koessler et al (2018) and Li andNorman (2018, 2020) study persuasion with multiple experts. In all of these papers, the experts can commit to revealing their information truthfully.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Finally, this paper is closely related to the literature on Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)). A number of articles that include Au and Kawai (2020), Kamenica (2016, 2017), Koessler et al (2018) and Li andNorman (2018, 2020) study persuasion with multiple experts. In all of these papers, the experts can commit to revealing their information truthfully.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…(2017), Au and Kawai (2020, 2021), and Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015, 2018) consider the case in which designers control independent pieces of information in applied examples. Koessler, Laclau, and Tomala (2022) provide existence results and properties of equilibria in games with multiple designers and multiple agents. This latter paper assumes that designers disclose information simultaneously, followed by agents making decisions simultaneously as well.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The strategic interaction between multiple information designers has been studied under the assumption of simultaneous and one‐stage information disclosure by, among others, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017), Albrecht (2017), Au and Kawai (2020, 2021), Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015, 2018), and Koessler, Laclau, and Tomala (2022). Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017) consider the case in which each designer is able to choose an information policy that is more informative than that of the other designer 4 Albrecht.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The recent literature on information design and Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011;Bergemann and Morris, 2019;Koessler, Laclau, and Tomala, 2021b) has given new interpretation and applications to splitting games: choosing a splitting amounts to choosing an information structure, and information design considers optimization problems or games over information structures. In Koessler, Laclau, Renault, and Tomala (2021a), we consider a zero-sum splitting game between two information designers who provide information to a decision maker, and where u(p, q) represents the expected payoff induced by the action chosen by the decision maker who has belief (p, q).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%