Interest Group Participation, Competition, and Conflict in the U.S. Supreme Court

Collins, Paul M.; Solowiej, Lisa A.

doi:10.1111/j.1747-4469.2007.00084.x

Cited by 17 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…However, the signing of amicus briefs is not limited to organizations with interests in the judiciary. While Schlozman and Tierney () find that only two‐thirds of interest groups use a legal strategy, more recent scholarship has documented a sharp increase in the number of amicus curiae briefs, filed and the diversity of organizations that sign the briefs (Caldeira and Wright ; Collins and Solowiej ). We expect that in the context of the interest group community as a whole, behavior in the legislative process is analogous to the signing of amicus curiae briefs, and the relationships between interest groups persist from one branch of government to another.…”

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confidence: 99%

Cue‐Taking in Congress: Interest Group Signals from Dear Colleague Letters

Christenson

Craig

2018

American J Political Sci

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Why do some pieces of legislation move forward while others languish? We address this fundamental question by examining the role of interest groups in Congress, specifically the effect of their legislative endorsements in Dear Colleague letters. These letters provide insights into the information that members use to both influence and make policy decisions. We demonstrate that endorsements from particularly well-connected interest groups are a strong cue for members with limited information early in the legislative process and help grow the list of bill cosponsors. As bills progress, such groups have less direct weight, while legislation supported by a larger number of organizations and a larger number of cosponsors is more likely to pass. Thus, we illuminate the usage of Dear Colleague letters in Congress, demonstrate how members use interest groups in the legislative process, and shed new light on the varying impact of groups on public policy.

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confidence: 99%

Cue‐Taking in Congress: Interest Group Signals from Dear Colleague Letters

Christenson

Craig

2018

American J Political Sci

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“…For example, we examined a random sample of 50 cases with amicus curiae briefs and found that all of the amicus briefs supporting the respondent were filed after the amicus briefs supporting the petitioner, overwhelmingly on the due date for the briefs. Collins and Solowiej (2007) corroborate this fact, revealing that 15% of amicus briefs filed for the respondent during the 1995 term cited amicus briefs supporting the petitioner by name for the purpose of neutralizing the argumentation in those briefs.…”

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confidence: 78%

“…This provides particularly compelling evidence that organized interests respond to the actions of their opponents and, seeking to counter their oppositions' influence on the Court, file their own amicus briefs. Because our results reveal that organizations file amicus briefs as a function of counteractive lobbying, this indicates that groups are able to alter the information environment in the Court by providing the justices with information regarding their own subjective interpretations as to the correct application of the law in a case, which run counter to those positions espoused by their opponents (e.g., Collins & Solowiej, 2007). Potentially, this might improve the justices' ability to make efficacious law in that a group's ability to refute its opponents' participation provides a strong incentive for that group to provide the justices with credible information (e.g., Austen-Smith & Wright, 1994).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 87%

Counteractive Lobbying in the U.S. Supreme Court

Solowiej

Collins

2009

American Politics Research

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Theories of counteractive lobbying assert that interest groups lobby for the purpose of neutralizing the advocacy efforts of their opponents. We examine the applicability of counteractive lobbying to explain interest group amicus curiae participation in the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions on the merits. Testing the counteractive lobbying hypotheses from 1953 to 2001, we provide strong support for the contention that interest groups engage in counteractive lobbying in the nation's highest court. Our findings indicate that, like the elected branches of government, the Supreme Court is properly viewed as a battleground for public policy in which organized interests clash in their attempts to etch their policy preferences into law.

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“…In this regard, interest groups who compete to have their views recognized by U.S. Supreme Court decisions that establish precedent for future cases are either crime control in their orientation or due process in their orientation, but generally not both. These studies include in the analyzed data a multitude of case types and are not narrowly focused on the issue of crime policy (see, for instance, Collins, 2004Collins & Martinek, 2010;Collins & Solowiej, 2007). Scholars who conduct empirical research in this area most typically study legislative processes (see Roby, 1969;Stolz, 1984Stolz, , 1985Stolz, , 1999Stolz, , 2005 at the exclusion of appellate court processes (one notable exception is the work of Ivers & O'Connor, 1987).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…The extant studies of the influence of special interests on appellate court processes, moreover, examine court policy outcomes in an aggregate manner. These studies include in the analyzed data a multitude of case types and are not narrowly focused on the issue of crime policy (see, for instance, Collins, 2004Collins & Martinek, 2010;Collins & Solowiej, 2007). This point is an important one; an appellate court's collective approach to a case and the factors that justices utilize to inform their decisions may vary across different types of cases.…”

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confidence: 99%