Theories of counteractive lobbying assert that interest groups lobby for the purpose of neutralizing the advocacy efforts of their opponents. We examine the applicability of counteractive lobbying to explain interest group amicus curiae participation in the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions on the merits. Testing the counteractive lobbying hypotheses from 1953 to 2001, we provide strong support for the contention that interest groups engage in counteractive lobbying in the nation's highest court. Our findings indicate that, like the elected branches of government, the Supreme Court is properly viewed as a battleground for public policy in which organized interests clash in their attempts to etch their policy preferences into law.

This article explores what is perhaps the single most important method of entrance into Congress for women—replacing a deceased husband. As was evident with the death of Governor Mel Carnahan (D-MO) and his wife, Jean Carnahan (D-MO), who subsequently served in the Senate, the succession of dead congressmen by their widows has been treated popularly by the news media, but has not received too much scholarly attention. In this study we examine the dramatic differences between widows and non-widow females and find that the groups differ in statistically significant ways in terms of their characteristics, their length in office, and their manner of leaving office. We also look at the difference between southern widows and non-southern widows and find support for the theory that widows from the South are more likely to serve short terms—act as stand-ins—until the party can determine who the more traditional candidate ought to be. We theorize that widows are apt to run for these seats because they enjoy high name recognition, which makes running in an election less risky. This, as Bledsoe and Herring (1990) demonstrate, increases the likelihood for women to run for office. We model widow succession in terms of the theoretical basis for the widow effect and find that the more senior a House member is before he dies, the more likely the widow is to serve in his place.

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Only a few studies of the lower federal court confirmation process consider the role of the race/gender of nominees in that process and none consider the intersection of party politics with those characteristics. We address this deficiency, arguing that the different electoral incentive structures of the two major parties have consequences for the treatment of minority and female nominees. The levels of minority and female support enjoyed by the Democratic Party, as well as the Republican Party’s desire to shed its reputation as being insensitive to issues of importance to those constituencies, lead us to expect that the nominations of minorities and women will be handled most expeditiously under conditions of unified Republican control, followed by unified Democratic control, divided control with a Republican president and divided control with a Democratic president. Our empirical analysis provides partial support for this hierarchy and demonstrates the importance of considering the conditioning effect of partisan politics.