Interest Groups and Bureaucrats in a Party‐democracy: The Case of Israel

Abstract

The relationship between interest groups and state bureaucrats in a party democracy tends to be based on parentela ties involving party mediation and resulting in deep and reciprocal commitment. The contacts between administrators and interest groups in Israel present a deviant case. The paper shows that despite the fact that Israel portrays the characteristics of a party democracy, interest groups gravitate towards the administration rather than toward political parties. Senior government officials interact extensively with interest groups; but at the same time they tend to discount the groups' activity. These deviations have been explained by the limited scope of interest group demands and the hybrid nature of Israel's administrative culture.

Against settlement before the European Court of Human Rights

“…In domestic public law, for example, scholars have revealed close ties and mutual dependence between interest groups who appear regularly before the courts and the state's civil service, responsible for implementing these decisions. 115 These studies also speak of the fluidity, a back-and-forth of personnel between the civil service and the 'other side'. At the ECtHR, it is clear that States enjoy a central role in the current friendly settlement system.…”