Intergovernmental Influence, Managerial Turnover, and City Energy Policy Adoption

Abstract

Urban sustainability policy provides opportunities for expanding global efforts for climate change mitigation. Yet local governments may not commit to make such policy efforts. It is well recognized that internal and external factors in state and local governments can be potential drivers. Less recognized is that green energy policy adoption can also be impacted by competitive federalism, under which state laws might influence the likelihood of local adoption. Drawing on prior studies on inter-governmental interactions and managerial turnover, we hypothesize the effect of intergovernmental influence, managerial turnover, and their interactions on city adoption of energy efficiency and renewable energy programs. Results of the multilevel regression model indicate that state influence via regulatory or financial tools can encourage city sustainable energy consumption and production, while managerial turnover can inhibit these conditions, but the negative impacts of managerial turnover can be reversed when the successors are recruited externally. Our tests support the existence of both local government free-riding and city mobilization to enact more green policies with externally hired city managers, thereby helping us to distinguish the impact of competitive federalism in local energy policy.

State Interventions and Interlocal Collaborations Across the Three Pillars of Sustainability

“…In addition, there is a 99.4 percent chance that state fiscal commitments positively affect interlocal collaborations for affordable housing issues. Consistent with prior studies, the current findings established a connection between state-level support and municipal actions for sustainability (Huang and Berry 2021;Saha 2009;Hawkins 2011;Kwon, Bae and Feiock 2012;Homsy and Warner 2015). When states provide tangible support for local actions, localities are more likely to pursue those actions (Payson 2020;Kim 2019;Homsy and Warner 2015;Farmer 2021).…”

“…This question is examined through the theoretical lens of contested federalism, which argues that competing goals and incentives in state-local government relationships lead to policy misalignments that cause distinct political transaction costs, which can impede sustainability actions (Rabe 2011; Youm and Feiock 2019; Farmer 2021; Feiock 2008). This theoretical perspective suggests that multilevel governance support within these hierarchical relationships can reduce the vertically distributed transaction costs (Youm and Feiock 2019; Feiock 2009; Homsy and Warner 2015; Huang and Berry 2021; Zhau and Dai 2022). This hierarchical focus highlights how the differences in attributes across sustainability policy dimensions affect municipal decisions to engage in interjurisdictional collaboration.…”

The Transaction Costs of the Administrative Presidency: Evidence From a Trump-Era Clean Water Act Enforcement Reduction

“…The results of this study provide sobering implications for U.S. environmental federalism and intergovernmental relations literature. Past literature argues that state governments have taken on a majority of environmental, climate, and sustainability enforcement responsibility to fill the void left by federal inaction due to congressional partisan polarization (Fiorino & Weted, 2020; Fowler, 2020; Huang & Berry, 2022). This has prompted in-depth analyses of the state's role in advancing or inhibiting local efforts, but the link between federal and local governance requires further analysis (Farmer, 2022a; Fisher, 2013; Homsy & Warner, 2015; Huang & Berry, 2022).…”

“…Much of the research on intergovernmental transaction costs has explored the costs of delegating bureaucratic authority from the standpoint of the states' relationships with the national government (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999;Horn, 1995;Rabe, 2011), and more recently the hierarchical complexities of statelocal relations (Bery & Haddad, 2023;Farmer, 2022aFarmer, , 2022bHomsy et al, 2019;Huang & Berry, 2022;Youm & Feiock, 2019). However, the complexities of transaction cost federalism can also manifest in the relationship between the federal and local governments (Farmer, 2015).…”