Internal consistency of subjective probabilities.

Peterson, Cameron R.; Ulehla, Z. Joseph; Miller, A. J.; Bourne, Lyle E.; Stilson, Donald W.

doi:10.1037/h0022546

Cited by 46 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 5 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Beliefs play a central role in both normative and descriptive theories of decision making (Camerer, 1992;Kahneman & Tversky, 1979;Schoemaker, 1982) and risk behavior (Vlek & Stallen, 1981;Yates, 1992). Probability judgments have been found to have intertemporal reliability, a necessary condition for psychometric validity (e.g., Peterson et al, 1965;Wallsten & Budescu, 1983;Whitcomb et al, 1993). Many studies have examined the accuracy and b The measure described in the text was transformed in this way in order to make higher scores reflect better performance.…”

Section: Belief Assessment Conceptualizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decision‐making competence: External validation through an individual‐differences approach

Parker

Fischhoff

2005

Behavioral Decision Making

381

442

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study asks to what extent (a) individuals show consistent performance differences across typical behavioral decision-making tasks, and (b) how those differences correlate with plausible real-world correlates of good decision making. Seven tasks, chosen to span the domain of decision-making skills, were administered to participants in an ongoing longitudinal study providing extensive social, psychological, and behavioral measures. Performance scores on individual tasks generally showed small, positive inter-task correlations. An aggregate measure of decision-making competence (DMC) was appropriately correlated with plausible sources, concomitants, and outcomes of good decision making, suggesting the underlying construct's external validity. Higher DMC scores were associated with more intact social environments, more constructive cognitive styles, and fewer 'maladaptive' risk behaviors. In each case, DMC adds to the predictive validity of general measures of cognitive ability. These results suggest that poor decision making on common laboratory tasks is related to real-world antecedents and consequences of poor decision making.

show abstract

Section: Belief Assessment Conceptualizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decision‐making competence: External validation through an individual‐differences approach

Parker

Fischhoff

2005

Behavioral Decision Making

381

442

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Consequently, their posterior odds at the end of a sequential sample reflect the effects of both biased inference and biased use of the priors. 42 The papers for which this is true are Peterson, Ulehla, Miller, Bourne, and Stilson (1965), Peterson, Schneider, and Miller (1965), , Phillips, Hays, and Edwards (1966), Beach (1968), Chinnis and Peterson (1968), Dale (1968), Peterson and Swensson (1968), Sanders (1968), Beach, Wise, and Barclay (1970), Edenborough (1975), Dave and Wolfe (2003), Kraemer and Weber (2004), and Sasaki and Kawagoe (2007). The one, partial exception is Strub (1969), who finds that while it is true for naïve experimental participants, participants with extensive training update Bayesianly.…”

Section: B Evidence From Simultaneous Samplesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Errors in Probabilistic Reasoning and Judgment Biases

Benjamin

2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Errors in probabilistic reasoning have been the focus of much psychology research and are among the original topics of modern behavioral economics. This chapter reviews theory and evidence on this topic, with the goal of facilitating more systematic study of belief biases and their integration into economics. The chapter discusses biases in beliefs about random processes, biases in belief updating, the representativeness heuristic as a possible unifying theory, and interactions between biased belief updating and other features of the updating situation. Throughout, I aim to convey how much evidence there is for (and against) each putative bias, and I highlight when and how different biases may be related to each other. The chapter ends by drawing general lessons for when people update too much or too little, reflecting on modeling challenges, pointing to areas of economics to which the biases are relevant, and highlighting some possible directions for future work.

show abstract

“…One would at least need to know the prior probability for each participant, in order to know how (s)he modifies it once (s)he is aware of a new message. Results of the few studies that follow this methodology indicate that participants produce revised probabilities close to those calculated by the experimenter using Bayes' identity and participants' prior probabilities and likelihoods as input (for example : Baratgin 2002b, Evans et al 1985, McCauley and Stitt 1978, Peterson et al 1965). …”

Section: Constraints Due To the Dynamic Coherence Criterionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is the mind Bayesian? The case for agnosticism

Baratgin

Politzer

2006

Mind & Society

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper aims to make explicit the methodological conditions that should be satisfied for the Bayesian model to be used as a normative model of human probability judgment. After noticing the lack of a clear definition of Bayesianism in the psychological literature and the lack of justification for using it, a classic definition of subjective Bayesianism is recalled, based on the following three criteria: An epistemic criterion, a static coherence criterion and a dynamic coherence criterion. Then it is shown that the adoption of this framework has two kinds of implications. The first one regards the methodology of the experimental study of probability judgment. The Bayesian framework creates pragmatic constraints on the methodology that are linked to the interpretation of, and the belief in, the information presented, or referred to, by an experimenter in order for it to be the basis of a probability judgment by individual participants. It is shown that these constraints have not been satisfied in the past, and the question of whether they can be satisfied in principle is raised and answered negatively. The second kind of implications consists of two limitations in the scope of the Bayesian model. They regard (i) the background of revision (the Bayesian model considers only revising situations but not updating situations), and (ii) the notorious case of the null priors. In both cases Lewis' rule is an appropriate alternative to Bayes' rule, but its use faces the same operational difficulties.Keywords Probability judgment • Subjective Bayesianism • Bayesian coherence • Probability revising • Probability updating • Linguistic pragmatics 2 IntroductionIn the imposing literature devoted to the psychological study of probability judgment, the use of a theoretical model as a referential norm for "rational" behavior is a usual methodology.1 Since the pioneering study by Rouanet (1961), and following the famous article by Edwards et al. (1963), the Bayesian model of probability has been the most frequently used as a normative reference or as a possible descriptive model. The implicit question that these studies attempt to answer is whether human beings perform probability judgment in a "Bayesian" manner. These interrogations go far beyond the realm of psychology: They also apply to the various domains that use the Bayesian model, such as economics (Davis and Holt 1993), law (Callen 1982), medicine (Casscells et al. 1978), artificial intelligence (Cohen 1985) and philosophy (Stich 1990).The present paper is not directly aimed towards these important debates concerning probabilistic functioning in humans, but is rather a methodological examination of the conditions under which the Bayesian model may be used as a normative theory. In other words, it aims to find an answer to the following question: Does the psychological literature take into consideration the various implications and constraints imposed by the usage of the Bayesian model as a normative reference? It will be argued that the answer is negative, an...

show abstract

Internal consistency of subjective probabilities.

Cited by 46 publications

References 5 publications

Decision‐making competence: External validation through an individual‐differences approach

Decision‐making competence: External validation through an individual‐differences approach

Errors in Probabilistic Reasoning and Judgment Biases

Is the mind Bayesian? The case for agnosticism

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About