International and Domestic Institutions in the Emu Process

Abstract

European progress toward monetary union takes place within the highly institutionalized setting of the European Community (EC). This paper examines the ways in which formal institutions and decisionmaking procedures have constrained the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) process. The EC's structure has both created demands for and facilitated cross-issue linkages, and these linkages characterize the successful bargaining on EMU. However, success also requires ratification. Domestic ratification procedures and changes in the EC's context of linkage have created challenges for the ratification of the Maastricht treaty. Ratification is also tied to concerns about democratic accountability, which arise from current legislative procedures and are the subject of ongoing institutional reform. Copyright 1993 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..

Fixed exchange rates with escape clauses: The political determinants of the European Monetary System realignments

“…Empirically, Frieden connects the size of countries' exports of specialized manufactured goods to the German currency bloc (Germany and Benelux countries) to less exchange rate depreciation and volatility. Exporters of these specialized, product-differentiated manufactured products will experience less exchange rate pass-through, will be less likely to care 11 Bargaining over the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1990, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland threatened to veto the deal unless richer countries agreed to more transfers (Martin, 2001). 12 Such evidence exists for the use of transfers to push for the completion of the single European market (Carrubba, 1997).…”

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No, prime minister: explaining the House of Commons’ vote on intervention in Syria

“…Work inspired by Putnam's (1988) twolevel game metaphor has examined how parliaments can shape domestic win-sets (the range of acceptable options to domestic constituents) through ratification and veto powers, which affects both the likelihood of international agreements and the advantages that domestic constraints can give leaders in international bargaining (Pahre 1997;Martin 2001;Hill 2003). Research on the role of political oppositions (Hagan 1993) and decision units (Hagan and Hermann 2001) also notes the importance of parliaments as centres for opposition and as potential veto players in fluid and dynamic decision making practices that exist alongside institutional authority.…”

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“…Based on the studies that incorporate a domestic politics perspective of EMU (Dyson and Featherstone, 1996;Martin, 1994;McNamara, 1994;Sandholtz, 1993;Young, 1999) important strong domestic actors can be identified: above all, political parties (in government and opposition) and the central bank. Other actors (parliaments, trade unions, etc.)…”