International Environmental Agreements for River Sharing Problems

Houba, Harold; Laan, Gerard van der; Zeng, Yuyu

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2337576

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Several studies have sought to examine the rise and content of basin-wide agreements. Drawing on game theory, Houba, van Der Lan, and Zeng (2015) and Ansink, Gengenbach, and Weikard (2017) focused on coalition formation in international river basins vis-à-vis water allocation. Both studies found that a grand coalition may not be economically attractive to the riparian states.…”

Section: Previous Work On International Water Agreementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Both studies found that a grand coalition may not be economically attractive to the riparian states. However, the two analyses used three riparians (Houba et al, 2015) and four riparians (Ansink et al, 2017) through a given geography of the river basin, and symmetry of all riparians vis-à-vis economic and social capacity. Consequently, it is difficult to draw conclusions for basins with more riparians or different basin geographies.…”

Section: Previous Work On International Water Agreementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Why are there so few basin-wide treaties? Economics and politics of coalition formation in multilateral international river basins

Dinar

Stefano

Nigatu

et al. 2019

Water International

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Examinations of international water treaties suggest that riparian states are not heeding the advice to adopt IWRM. Theories suggest that the larger the number of negotiating states, the lower the cost (per state) of the joint operation of treaties, but the higher the transaction costs of negotiating and maintaining them. We model the trade-off between benefits and costs associated with the number of treaty signatories and apply it to a global treaty dataset. Findings confirm that the transaction costs of negotiation and the economies of scale are important in determining the paucity of basin-wide agreements, the treaties' content and their extent. ARTICLE HISTORYcan contribute to acceptable and effective management of transboundary rivers (in this article we do not address transboundary aquifers), but effectiveness appears to depend on the specific design features of the treaties.Research focusing on international water agreements covering multilateral basins also suggests that treaties that include all the riparian states (basin-wide treaties, such as the 1967 La Plata agreement) are exceptionally rare, existing in only 13% of the world's multilateral basins (Giordano et al., 2013). This finding contradicts the international agencies, environmentalists and engineers who encourage states to negotiate and reach basin-wide agreements to develop the basin in an efficient manner. With the exception of qualitative case studies (Kempkey, Pinard, Pochat, & Dinar, 2009;Waterbury, 2002), there is little systematic empirical analysis of the factors influencing the formation and design of basin-wide accords. Consequently, we are unable to provide policy advice to mediators attempting to promote the formation of basin-wide accords.This article seeks to fill this gap in the literature by attempting to explain the factors accounting for the relatively low number of basin-wide agreements in multilateral basins and for the content of these agreements. Combining theories of international relations and economics, we consider the influence of two factors. The first is the transaction costs of negotiating, enforcing and monitoring treaty commitments among a larger number of signatory riparian states. The second is economies of scale: the benefit of having a large group of states involved in the treaty, which could lower the average cost of the joint activity for each state. We examine the impact of these two factors not only on treaty formation but also on treaty contents, looking at the specific topics and problems addressed in water treaties (or issue areas) and the institutional features. Treaties governing international basins can cover various issues, such as allocating the river's waters, environmental regulation, hydropower generation, groundwater regulation, navigation, fishing, irrigation and infrastructure development. River treaties can also include institutional mechanisms for implementing the treaty and maintaining future cooperation. We examine the influence of economies of scale and transaction costs in the basin-wid...

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Section: Previous Work On International Water Agreementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Previous Work On International Water Agreementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why are there so few basin-wide treaties? Economics and politics of coalition formation in multilateral international river basins

Dinar

Stefano

Nigatu

et al. 2019

Water International

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“…Environmental sustainability has gained increasing attention in recent years (e.g., Houba et al, 2015; Latinopoulos and Sartzetakis, 2015; Llopis‐Albert and Pulido‐Velazquez, 2015). The EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) establishes a framework for the protection of all water bodies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Application of Fuzzy Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis to Public Participation Projects in Support of the EU Water Framework Directive

Llopis‐Albert¹,

Merigó

et al. 2018

Water Environment Research

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This study analyzes the level of satisfaction of stakeholders in the public participation process (PPP) of water resources management, which is mandatory according to the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD). The methodology uses a fuzzy set/qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), which allows the identification of a combination of factors that lead to the outcome that is stakeholders' satisfaction. It allows dealing with uncertain environments due to the heterogeneous nature of stakeholders and factors. The considered causes range from environmental objectives pursued, actual capacity of efficiently carrying out those objectives, socioeconomic development of the region, level of involvement and means of participation of the stakeholders engaged in the PPP, and alternative policies and measures that should be performed. Results support the argument that different causal paths explain the stakeholders' satisfaction. The methodology may help in the implementation of the WFD and conflict resolution since it leads to greater fairness, social equity, and consensus among stakeholders.

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“…The theoretical river sharing literature that emerged after a seminal contribution by Ambec and Sprumont (2002) has used solution concepts from cooperative game theory and has focused on the grand coalition of all countries located along a river. Some recent contributions to this literature are by Ambec and Ehlers (2008), van den Brink et al (2012), Ambec et al (2013), Houba et al (2015) and Weikard (2012, 2015). Be ´al et al (2013) and Ansink and Houba (2015) provide surveys.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

River coalitions and water trade

Ansink

Gengenbach²,

Weikard

2017

Oxford Economic Papers

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We analyse coalition stability in a game with a spatial structure. We consider a set of agents located along a river who abstract scarce water for their own benefit. Agents may enter an agreement to mutually acknowledge property rights in river water as a prerequisite for water trade. We find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and sign an agreement. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. This result is driven by the spatial structure of our game, in which water that is to be delivered to a downstream coalition member via the territory of an intermediate singleton can be seized.

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International Environmental Agreements for River Sharing Problems

Cited by 3 publications

References 33 publications

Why are there so few basin-wide treaties? Economics and politics of coalition formation in multilateral international river basins

Why are there so few basin-wide treaties? Economics and politics of coalition formation in multilateral international river basins

Application of Fuzzy Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis to Public Participation Projects in Support of the EU Water Framework Directive

River coalitions and water trade

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