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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe study multiple agents along a general river structure that is expressed by a geography matrix and who have access to limited local resources, quasi-linear preferences over water and money and cost functions dependent upon river inflow and own extraction. Unanimity bargaining determines the water allocation and monetary transfers. We translate International Water Law into either disagreement outcomes or individual aspiration levels. In the former case, we apply the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, in the latter case the agents have to compromise in order to agree and we apply the asymmetric Nash rationing solution. In both cases the optimization problem is separable into two subproblems: the efficient water allocation that maximizes utilitarian welfare given the geography matrix; and the determination of the monetary transfers associated with the weights. We show that the Nash rationing solution may result in nonparticipation, therefore we generalize to the case with participation constraints.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe study coalition formation and the strategic timing of membership of an IEA for environmental issues in the Coalitional Bargaining Game (CBG) of Gomes (2005, Econometrica). For the general CBG, we derive the necessary and sufficient condition for immediate formation of the grand coalition. We apply the CBG to a river sharing problem with two symmetric upstream agents and one downstream agent. Taking the discount factor and a productivity variable of water as parameters, we identify five regions in the parameter space. First, there is a region in which the grand coalition always forms immediately. Second, there are two regions in which there is for sure gradual coalition formation, in one of these regions there is a positive probability that the upstream agents form a monopoly. Third, there are two regions in which the grand coalition forms immediately with positive probability, but also gradual coalition formation might occur with positive probability.

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Background At a time when a highly contagious pandemic and global political and economic turmoil are intertwined, worldwide cooperation under the leadership of an international organization has become increasingly important. This study aimed to estimate the effect of COVID-19 on public confidence in the World Health Organization (WHO), which will serve as a reference for other international organizations regarding the maintenance of their credibility in crisis management and ability to play a greater role in global health governance. Methods We obtained individual data from the World Values Survey (WVS). A total of 44,775 participants aged 16 and older from 40 countries in six WHO regions were included in this study. The COVID-19 pandemic was used as a natural experiment. We obtained difference-in-differences (DID) estimates of the pandemic’s effects by exploiting temporal variation in the timing of COVID-19 exposure across participants interviewed from 2017 to 2020 together with the geographical variation in COVID-19 severity at the country level. Public confidence in the WHO was self-reported by the respondents. Results Among the participants, 28,087 (62.73%) reported having confidence in the WHO. The DID estimates showed that the COVID-19 pandemic could significantly decrease the likelihood of people reporting confidence in the WHO after controlling for multiple covariates (adjusted OR 0.54, 95% CI: 0.49–0.61), especially during the global outbreak (0.35, 0.24–0.50). The effect was found in both younger individuals (0.58, 0.51–0.66) and older adults (0.49, 0.38–0.63) and in both males (0.47, 0.40–0.55) and females (0.62, 0.53–0.72), with a vulnerability in males (adjusted P for interaction = 0.008). Conclusion Our findings are relevant regarding the impact of COVID-19 on people’s beliefs about social institutions of global standing, highlighting the need for the WHO and other international organizations to shoulder the responsibility of global development for the establishment and maintenance of public credibility in the face of emergencies, as well as the prevention of confidence crises.