International Environmental Agreements with Asymmetric Countries

Abstract

IEA, Coalition stability, Implementation, Monetary transfers, F50, C70, C60, H23,

Largest Consistent Set in International Environmental Agreements

“…About the environmental preservation, the developed countries are characterized by a higher measure of environmental awareness ( p h ) than developing ones ( p l ). From a first numerical investigation, the Grand Coalition can be farsighted stable from the perspective of both kinds of countries when p h and p l are closer, unlike if the myopic stability is considered (see Biancardi and Villani 2010). This remark suggests that the growth of environmental awareness p in case of symmetric countries, or of p l in case of asymmetric countries, can guarantee the stability of the Grand Coalition.…”

“…It is the same for every country, since they are assumed to be identical. Although this assumption is not very realistic, especially in the situation of environmental pollution in which there are asymmetric countries (see Biancardi and Villani 2010;Osmani and Tol 2010), the value added of our contribution is to consider the farsighted stability instead of the myopic behaviour.…”

The Size of Farsighted Stable Coalitions in a Game of Pollution Abatement

“…Other possibilities are that countries are not identical or that more coalitions occur. A first investigation of the case of asymmetric countries is given in the companion paper by Biancardi and Villani [2009].…”

International Environmental Agreements: Doomed to Fail or Destined to Succeed? A Review of the Literature

“…Another paper to consider the standard two-stage open membership game is Biancardi and Villani (2010), as mentioned in Section 2. They consider two kinds of countries characterized by different damages from emissions and the choice variable is the abatement level.…”