International intellectual property rights protection and the rate of product innovation

Lai, Edwin L.-C.

doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(97)00059-x

Cited by 324 publications

(297 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Then, we provide a numerical simulation on the welfare-maximizing path of patent 44 (P2) also implies g > , which guarantees convergence. protection.…”

Section: Stage-dependent Ipr Protectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Grossman and Helpman (1991) …nd that strengthening Southern IPR protection either has no e¤ect or a negative e¤ect on Northern innovation. 11 Lai (1998) 9 Chen and Puttitanum (2005) also argue that optimal IPR protection should depend on a country's level of development, and they analyze this issue in a one-period game-theoretic model in which the level of development is captured by an exogenous parameter. 10 See for example Grossman and Helpman (1991), Helpman (1993), Lai (1998) 11 Grossman and Helpman (1991) consider a tax (subsidy) on imitation that decreases (increases) Southern imitation, which is similar to the e¤ects of IPR protection.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Stage-dependent intellectual property rights

Chu

Cozzi

Galli

2014

Journal of Development Economics

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Inspired by the Chinese experience, we develop a Schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier in which economic growth in the developing country is driven by domestic innovation as well as imitation and transfer of foreign technologies through foreign direct investment. We show that optimal intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is stage-dependent. At an early stage of development, the country implements weak IPR protection to facilitate imitation. At a later stage of development, the country implements strong IPR protection to encourage domestic innovation. Therefore, the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing levels of patent strength increase as the country evolves towards the world technology frontier, and this dynamic pattern is consistent with the actual evolution of patent strength in China. We are very grateful to the anonymous Referees and Patrick Francois (the Editor) for their insightful comments that have improved the manuscript signi…cantly. We also would like to thank Elias Dinopoulos, Rachel Gri¢ th, Oleksandr Talavera, Fabrizio Zilibotti, and seminar participants at

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“…Then, we provide a numerical simulation on the welfare-maximizing path of patent 44 (P2) also implies g > , which guarantees convergence. protection.…”

Section: Stage-dependent Ipr Protectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stage-dependent intellectual property rights

Chu

Cozzi

Galli

2014

Journal of Development Economics

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“…Helpman (1993) and Glass and Saggi (1999) assumed stronger IPR would raise imitation costs, tending to diminish technology flows and global innovation. Lai (1998) noted that innovation could be enhanced if FDI is the form of technology transfer. Yang and Maskus (2001) found that patent reforms would both raise imitation costs and reduce the costs of technology licensing, with the latter encouraging greater information transfer and innovation in equilibrium.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intellectual property rights, technology transfer and exports in developing countries

Yang

Maskus

2009

Journal of Development Economics

149

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We develop a model to analyze one mechanism under which stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection may improve the ability of firms in developing countries to break into export markets. A Northern firm with a superior process technology chooses either exports or technology transfer through licensing as its mode of supplying the Southern market, based on local IPR policy. Given this decision, the North and South firms engage in Cournot competition in both markets. We find that stronger IPR would enhance technology transfer through licensing and reduce the South firm's marginal production cost, thereby increasing its exports. Welfare in the South would rise (fall) if that country has high (low) absorptive capacity. Excessively strong IPR diminish competition and welfare, however. Adding foreign direct investment as an additional channel of technology transfer sustains these basic messages.JEL Classification: F14, L13, O1, O34

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“…(t + 1) = (L + 1) (t) 1 + (1 + ) L (t) for (t) 2 ( ; 1) : (A8) 27 By using the labor market condition for the lagging country B and the free-entry condition, we can easily verify that A A (t) A B (t) > w A (t) w B (t) = 1 > 1 holds.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Condition (27) requires that the pro…tability of an innovation is high; the time preference rate is large and/or and the elasticity of substitution 1 is low. What if the knowledge gap, K A (t)=K B (t); is larger than ?…”

Section: Leapfrogging Cyclesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leapfrogging cycles in international competition

Furukawa

2014

Econ Theory

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Technological leadership has shifted at various times from one country to another. We propose a mechanism that endogenously explains this perpetual cycle of technological leapfrogging in a two-country model including the dynamic optimization of an in…nitely-lived consumer. In the model, the stock of knowledge accumulates in each country over time because of domestic innovation and spillovers from foreign innovation. We show that if the international knowledge spillovers are reasonably e¢ cient, technological leadership may shift …rst from one country to another, and then alternate between countries along an equilibrium path.

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International intellectual property rights protection and the rate of product innovation

Cited by 324 publications

References 7 publications

Stage-dependent intellectual property rights

Stage-dependent intellectual property rights

Intellectual property rights, technology transfer and exports in developing countries

Leapfrogging cycles in international competition

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