International Responses to Iranian Nuclear Defiance: The Non-Aligned Movement and the Issue of Non-Compliance

Abstract

This article explores the responses of the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) to Iran's violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), focusing on the stance adopted by members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In February 2006, key NAM members voted to refer Iran to the UN Security Council in a move that stunned Iranian diplomats, and seemed to signal a collapse in NAM solidarity on fundamental non-proliferation issues. This article assesses the signifi cance of this event, analysing the extent to which it represents a softening in the ideological divide between NAM and Western approaches to third-party non-compliance, and a convergence in attitudes towards the nuclear non-proliferation regime more generally. It draws on the interlinking concepts of international system, international society and global society to help explain these developments, exploring the hurdles and opportunities associated with any attempt to build on the fragile consensus emerging among the NNWS over the need to respond more decisively to NPT violations.

Living on the Edge

“…Iran asked if the P5 + 1 could 'clarify whether they recognize the NPT as the basis for determining the scope of this right [enrichment]'. 55 A similar situation occurred in 2008 when Tehran again responded to P5 + 1 proposals by suggesting negotiations on various subjects without directly addressing the terms of the P5 + 1 offer. 56 At the same time, Tehran was keenly aware of its increasingly precarious position.…”

“…Ahmed reveals that it was only after an intense and public 'tussle between supporters of overt weaponisation and proponents of the offi cial policy of nuclear ambiguity' that Pakistan decided to test. 55 The second understanding of ambiguity relates to a situation characterised by 'genuine uncertainty' on the part of external observers and where there is a 'lack of suffi cient knowledge as to the technical status of the country under study'. 56 Relevant examples here include Argentina and Brazil.…”

“…However, Iran did not provide evidence to back up this explanation to the IAEA. 55 Moreover, the IAEA came into possession of information that Iran may have acquired expertise from abroad to develop a 'high explosive charge suitable for an implosion type nuclear device', 56 and Iran did not provide any clarifying information to the Agency on 'experiments involving the explosive compression of uranium deuteride to produce a short burst of neutrons'. 57 Finally, Iran failed to address IAEA questions related to evidence that military-related organisations had participated in procurement for the country's alleged nuclear studies, 58 and that defence companies had produced nuclearrelated components, 59 including centrifuge parts.…”

“…Tanya Ogilvie-White writes that a core NAM preoccupation with the NPT has been 'to ensure that NNWS that have forgone the right to develop nuclear weapons are adequately compensated for their sacrifi ce via the provision of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes'. 55 From the outset, then, Iran's narrative of victimisation resounded with NAM members who were sympathetic to Iran's cause and tended to support Iran's nuclear position. 56 During its 2006 summit in Havana, for example, NAM member countries 'declared their support for Iran's nuclear programme for civil purposes in their fi nal written statement'.…”

Money can't buy you love: the European Union member states and Iranian nuclear programme 2002–2009

“…The "West" has been the strongest opponent to the Iranian nuclear programme, by academic (Ogilvie-White 2007 as well as insider policy accounts (El Baradei 2011). While studies on Iranian nuclear programme have focused mostly on the US policy towards Iran, the USA is not the only player; other states' preferences are important too.…”