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This article explores the responses of the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) to Iran's violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), focusing on the stance adopted by members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In February 2006, key NAM members voted to refer Iran to the UN Security Council in a move that stunned Iranian diplomats, and seemed to signal a collapse in NAM solidarity on fundamental non-proliferation issues. This article assesses the signifi cance of this event, analysing the extent to which it represents a softening in the ideological divide between NAM and Western approaches to third-party non-compliance, and a convergence in attitudes towards the nuclear non-proliferation regime more generally. It draws on the interlinking concepts of international system, international society and global society to help explain these developments, exploring the hurdles and opportunities associated with any attempt to build on the fragile consensus emerging among the NNWS over the need to respond more decisively to NPT violations.

Expansion of civilian nuclear power means that greater international cooperation is required to ensure that terrorist groups do not acquire nuclear and radiological materials. The global nuclear security regime urgently needs to be strengthened; the authors write that boosting the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the best place to start. The IAEA established a nuclear security program in 2002. Recently, this programÕs successes, including helping states repatriate highly enriched uranium to Russia and the United States, have prompted more national interest in the IAEAÕs nuclear security assistance missions and led to more requests for advisory and evaluation services. If given the authority, the IAEA could verify the continuous level of nuclear security of member states and assess and coordinate the implementation of any actions that need to be taken. The authors write that the problem of the IAEAÕs limited authority is tied to fundamental debates in the international community over how to deal with threats in a globalized world. Resources need to be pooled; expertise needs to be shared and centralized; and common standards need to be set, monitored, and enforced in the interests of a safer world. But not all states are convinced of this, and some are suspicious that states advocating global governance are using their power to dominate the global security agenda. The authors explore the expansion of the IAEAÕs mandate and ask the pivotal question confronting the international community: How can states build consensus on the need to prioritize nuclear security?

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