International support networks and the calculus of uprising

Abstract

How does the anticipation of external support for both opposition groups and governments affect the likelihood and form (violent vs. nonviolent) of uprising within states? We develop a novel approach to address these issues, building on a network perspective. Our model suggests that both opposition groups and governments’ strategies are affected by an anticipation of the degree and nature of expected support by external parties (states and non-state actors). Using a set of indicators – including cultural affinity, strategic factors, and normative values – we develop a unique measure of anticipated support based on the potential support networks of target states and their opposition in order to evaluate our hypotheses. We argue that the anticipated balance of support for opposition and governments affects: (a) the likelihood of uprising and (b) the principal – violent or nonviolent – strategy used by the opposition group. We analyze data on violent and nonviolent civil conflicts over the period 1946–2010. We find that when the balance of anticipated support favors the opposition over their target government, the onset of an uprising is more likely. Specifically, the type of anticipated support has implications for whether a violent or nonviolent uprising occurs. These findings provide new insights into the role external support can play even before conflict occurs.

Major power politics and non-violent resistance movements

“…Doing so, we also contribute to the study of external actor impacts by focusing on the identity and direction of external support during non-violent conflicts. More importantly, unlike earlier studies, with few exceptions (Jackson et al, 2020), this research does not perceive external assistance as a given, but considers it as a strategic choice. Any increase in our understanding of peaceful protest success or failure strengthens our understanding of peace processes in general.…”

“…Therefore, major powers' intentions to influence the outcome of a non-violent movement in favor of the standing government might be directly associated with the extent to which they perceive the government or territory as strategic. To our best knowledge, there has been no systematic attempt in the literature, except a new study (Jackson et al, 2020), to make a strategic anticipation regarding the nature of external support for/against non-violent movements, although many previous studies have theoretically noted that external actors interfere in conflicts based on their calculations of strategic self-interests or rivalries with the target government rather than for the sake of helping the campaign attain its objectives (Colaresi and Thompson, 2002;Gleditsch et al, 2008;Maoz and San-Akca, 2012;Salehyan, 2008;San-Akca, 2009.…”

Local Politics, Global Consequences: How Structural Imbalance in Domestic Political Networks Affects International Relations

“…Our approach builds on recent network studies of internal conflict, which emphasize the role of network structure in generating conflict behavior (Dorff, Gallop and Minhas 2020;Metternich, Dorff, Gallop, Weschle and Ward 2013). That literature focuses strictly on conflict, and it incorporates connections between internal groups and outside actors only as control variables (though see Jackson, San-Akca and Maoz (2020)). By contrast, we study general patterns of interaction among all domestic actors, and we examine external relations as the main outcome of interest.…”

Civil war as a social process: actors and dynamics from pre- to post-war

“…4 When states defend unequal arrangements and resort to indiscriminate repression in response, state challengers "have little choice but to arm themselves" and violence escalates (p. 50). 5 Divisions within social movements (Seymour et al, 2016), defections from state repressive apparatuses that channel arms and military skills to nascent armed groups (Della Porta et al, 2018), and external support, whether actual in the form of arms, funds, recruits, and safe havens (Salehyan, 2009) or anticipated (Jackson et al, 2020), fuel radicalization of actors, militarization of tactics, and social polarization underpinning escalation (Florea, 2017). Civil wars in the former Yugoslavia are a notorious example of this dynamic.…”