The information organizations choose to disclose is a strategic consideration. The ''success'' of strategic disclosure is contingent in turn on the target audience's values and preferences. The disclosure of and reaction to organizational information thus involves a strategic interaction between the producer and consumer of the information, yet prior communication research has focused on only one side or the other of this equation. In response, we examine organizationÁpublic interactions in a domain with key, measurable outcomes*the charitable donations marketplace*and propose a game-theoretic explanation of organizational disclosures and individual donations. The study specifically emphasizes two core donor preferences*the desire for impact and the desire for publicity*with donors choosing between organizations based on how well the organization satisfies these preferences. Organizations' optimal level of disclosure, in turn, depends on their own ''type'' and the types of donors they attract. This study recommends organizations think of their disclosure and efficiency-related decisions as conveying valuable, yet distinct, information to two ideal-types of prospective donors: the impact maximizer and the publicity maximizer. Mapping and targeting the ''right'' mix of donors is a key managerial decision that ultimately impacts both the organization's financial outcomes and donors' satisfaction with the donation experience. Information disclosure is a communication tool that individuals and organizations alike employ to influence decision making. This is keenly evident in the market for charitable contributions, where nonprofit organizations try to sway potential donors through the strategic release of financial, performance, and fundraising-related data intended to not only boost accountability and public trust but also attract greater donations (Gandía, 2011;Saxton & Guo, 2011). To better comprehend such processes involving both the determinants and behavioral outcomes of communication decisions, we need a theoretical approach that integrates the strategic, interactive nature of decision making undertaken by both producers and consumers of information.Communication studies to date have generally focused exclusively on either the source or the receiver of this communication process. To remedy this, we propose a game-theoretic explanation of disclosureÁdonation interactions. Such an approach explicitly incorporates the decision making undertaken by both the donor and the discloser in the fundraising arena. Our model also recognizes that payoffs associated with strategically disclosed fundraising information are contingent on individual donors' values and preferences: Donors react differently based on the extent to which they are motivated by altruism, vested interests, fairness, social impact, publicityseeking, or the ''warm glow'' from donating (e.g., Anker, Feeley, & Kim, 2010;Bergstrom, Blume, & Varian, 1986;Sargeant, 2001). By incorporating multiple forms of donor utility (satisfaction), the model strives to e...