Internet Interconnection Economic Model and its Analysis: Peering and Settlement

Weiss, Martin B. H.; Shin, Seung Jae

doi:10.1023/b:netn.0000023380.38300.25

Cited by 43 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…For example, [20] presents a simple traffic model between local ISPs and uses a simple economic model to predict when these ISP would use no-payment peering rather than customer-provider peering for their local traffic. In [17], the authors give an interesting analysis of how transit and customer prices are set in a network consisting of multiple ISPs.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A game–theoretic analysis of the implications of overlay network traffic on ISP peering

Wang¹,

Chiu²,

Lui³

2008

Computer Networks

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a b s t r a c tInter-ISP traffic flow determines the settlement between ISPs and affects the perceived performance of ISP services. In today's Internet, the inter-ISP traffic flow patterns are controlled not only by ISPs' policy-based routing configuration and traffic engineering, but also by application layer routing. The goal of this paper is to study the economic implications of this shift in Internet traffic control assuming rational ISPs and subscribers. For this purpose, we build a general traffic model that predicts traffic patterns based on subscriber distribution and abstract traffic controls such as caching functions and performance sensitivity functions. We also build a game-theoretic model of subscribers picking ISPs, and ISPs making provisioning and peering decisions. In particular, we apply this to a local market where two ISPs compete for market share of subscribers under two traffic patterns: ''Web" and ''P2P overlay", that typifies the transition the current Internet is going through. Our methodology can be used to quantitatively demonstrate that (1) while economy of scale is the predominant property of the competitive ISP market, P2P traffic may introduce unfair distribution of peering benefit (i.e. free-riding); (2) the large ISP can restore more fairness by reducing its private capacity (bandwidth throttling), which has the drawback of hurting business growth; and (3) ISPs can reduce the level of peering (e.g. by reducing peering bandwidth) to restore more fairness, but this has the side-effect of also reducing the ISPs' collective bargaining power towards subscribers.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A game–theoretic analysis of the implications of overlay network traffic on ISP peering

Wang¹,

Chiu²,

Lui³

2008

Computer Networks

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“…Therefore, the peering agreement could be considered as a preliminary agreement of collaboration between two Internet providers. Second, some recent studies have shown that asymmetric effect was one major factor that has a negative and significant impact on tying a peering agreement (Carter and Wright, 2003;Weiss and Shin, 2004;Badasyan and Chakrabarti, 2008;Shrimali and Kumar, 2008;Jahn and Prüfer, 2008;Lippert and Spagnalo, 2008). Internet providers prefer tie peering with providers of similar size, otherwise transit agreements.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Small-world or Scale-Free Phenomena in Internet: What Implications for the Next-generation Networks?

M’Chirgui¹

2012

RES

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I am very gratefully to Thierry Pénard for his helpful suggestions and insights. This work was partially supported by the ACTRICE project. AbstractThe paper examines the large-scale topological structure of the Internet in order to see whether the structure exhibits some features that lead Internet Services Providers to go aside further collaboration for the deployment of next-generation networks. The results indicate the existence of positive signs or early stages of possible move towards more cooperative relationships, mainly among backbones. These findings have implications for the next-generation networks policy and strategy, particularly the move towards strategic alliances after the recent phase of mergers and acquisitions.

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“…Further, we extended studies by examining the benefits of the customer providers only, which purchased transit services [12]. However, the remaining literature on the economics of interconnection considers the intercarrier compensation based only on the flows of traffic [2,[13][14][15][16].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intercarrier Compensation between Providers of Different Layers: Advantages of Transmission Initiator Determination

Davoyan

Effelsberg

2010

Networking 2010

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Abstract. This paper addresses the important issue of providing balanced allocation of the interconnection costs between networks. We analyze how beneficial is the determination of the original initiator of a transmission to the providers of different layers. The introduced model, where intercarrier compensation is based on the differentiated traffic flows, was compared with the existing solution, which performs cost compensation based on the traffic flows. For our analysis we considered both unilateral and bilateral settlement arrangements.

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Internet Interconnection Economic Model and its Analysis: Peering and Settlement

Cited by 43 publications

References 1 publication

A game–theoretic analysis of the implications of overlay network traffic on ISP peering

A game–theoretic analysis of the implications of overlay network traffic on ISP peering

Small-world or Scale-Free Phenomena in Internet: What Implications for the Next-generation Networks?

Intercarrier Compensation between Providers of Different Layers: Advantages of Transmission Initiator Determination

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