Internet-scale Insecurity of Consumer Internet of Things

Abstract

The number of Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices actively communicating across the Internet is continually increasing, as these devices are deployed across a variety of sectors, constantly transferring private data across the Internet. Due to the extensive deployment of such devices, the continuous discovery and persistence of IoT-centric vulnerabilities in protocols, applications, hardware, and the improper management of such IoT devices has resulted in the rampant, uncontrolled spread of malware threatening consumer IoT devices. To this end, this work adopts a novel, macroscopic methodology for fingerprinting Internet-scale compromised IoT devices, revealing crucial cyber threat intelligence on the insecurity of consumer IoT devices. By developing data-driven techniques rooted in machine learning methods and analyzing 3.6 TB of network traffic data, we discover 855,916 compromised IP addresses, with 310,164 fingerprinted as IoT. Further analysis reveals China and Brazil to be hosting the most significant population of compromised IoT devices (100,000 and 55,000, respectively). Additionally, we provide a longitudinal analysis on data from one year ago against this work, revealing the evolving trends of IoT exploitation, such as the increased number of vendors targeted by malware, rising from 50 to 131. Moreover, countries such as China (420% increased infected IoT count) and Indonesia (177% increased infected IoT count) have seen notably high increases in infection rates. Last, we compare our geographic results against Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) ratings, verifying that countries with high GCI ratings, such as the Netherlands and Germany, had relatively low infection rates. However, upon further inspection, we find that the GCI rate does not accurately represent the consumer IoT market, with countries such as China and Russia being rated with “high” CGI scores, yet hosting a large population of infected consumer IoT devices.

Cybersecurity in the Internet of Things in Industrial Management

“…It allows shifting the paradigm "from the Internet of Things (IoT) to Internet of Intelligence (IoI)" to provide connectivity, while maintaining the ability to process knowledge and make decisions autonomously [47]. It aims to develop a novel methodology for fingerprinting IoT devices by building data-driven techniques rooted in machine learning methods, which allows unveiling compromised IP addresses throughout diverse geographical areas [5]. Moreover, and since there is a lack of effective IoT cyber risk management frameworks [69], of effective sensor networks [70], it raises the issue of a distributed denial of service (DDoS) in terms of classifications and opportunities for attacks, particularly in the health sector, in areas of limited security [22], while examining the changing legal environment in a IoT regulatory context [48].…”

“…The IoT is a system where the Internet is linked to the physical world through sensors [2]. It can be deemed as the management of a network of devices, home appliances, and vehicles of the IoT, and is challenging due to the dynamic nature of the linkage between devices, actors, and resource constraints [3,4] involving hardware, software, sensors, and connectivity that allows them to connect, gather, and exchange data [5]. At the core of the IoT is the "smart factory", which comprehends several different elements: person, process, intelligent object, and technological ecosystem [6].…”

Cybersecurity in the Internet of Things in Industrial Management

“…Finally, others, propose solutions to new wireless challenges such as the 6G, shifting the paradigm "from Internet of Things (IoT) to Internet of Intelligence (IoI)", to provide connectivity, while mantaining the ability to process knowledge and make de-cisions autonomously [47]. Developing thus a novel methodology for fingerprinting IoT devices, by building data-driven techniques rooted in machine learning methods, which allows to unveil compromised IP addresses throughout diverse geographical areas [5]. Also it focus on the issue of distributed denial of service (DDoS) scope, in terms of classifications and opportunities for attacks, particularly in the health sector, of limited security [22], while examining the changing legal environment in the IoT regulatory context [48]; 4.4.…”

“…However, IoT is fragile in terms of many security is-sues that are frequently highly demanding due to its complex context and a vast num-ber of tools, which present flaws in terms of resources [1]. IoT is a system where the Internet is linked to the physical world through sensors [2] and can be deemed as the management of a network of devices, home appliances and vehicles of the IoT that is challenging due to the dynamic nature of the linkage between devices, actors and re-source constraints [3,4] involving hardware, software, sensors, and connectivity which allows them to connect, gather and exchange data [5]. Central for for IoT is the "smart factory", in which comprehends diverse elements: person, process, intelligent object and technological ecosystem [6].…”

Easing the Conscience with OPC UA

“…In addition, Internet measurements have been utilized to find insecurely configured embedded devices [10], detect compromised IoT devices [42,46,58], and study cloud usage as well as communication security of IoT devices [54]. Motivated by these observations, we set out to study whether modern Internet-facing industrial appliances that use the OPC UA protocol capitalize on the promised increases in security.…”