Interpersonal Consequences of Deceptive Expressions of Sadness

Abstract

Emotional expressions evoke predictable responses from observers; displays of sadness are commonly met with sympathy and help from others. Accordingly, people may be motivated to feign emotions to elicit a desired response. In the absence of suspicion, we predicted that emotional and behavioral responses to genuine (vs. deceptive) expressers would be guided by empirically valid cues of sadness authenticity. Consistent with this hypothesis, untrained observers (total N = 1,300) reported less sympathy and offered less help to deceptive (vs. genuine) expressers of sadness. This effect was replicated using both posed, low-stakes, laboratory-created stimuli, and spontaneous, real, high-stakes emotional appeals to the public. Furthermore, lens models suggest that sympathy reactions were guided by difficult-to-fake facial actions associated with sadness. Results suggest that naive observers use empirically valid cues to deception to coordinate social interactions, providing novel evidence that people are sensitive to subtle cues to deception.

The Humanbecoming Concept Inventing Model: Feeling Sad

“…Feeling sad arises with a valued loss. Exploring feeling sad in different disciplines indicated that feeling sad arises from a valued loss (Bunkers, 2010;Draper, 1999;Freed & Mann, 2007;Garg, 2019;Garg & Lerner, 2013;Gunderson et al, 2021;Knowles & Langley, 2012;Lazarus, 1991;Levenson, 1999;Mouchet-Mages & Baylé, 2008;Nesse, 1990;Phillips, 2009;Rivers et al, 2006;Smith & Lazarus, 1993;Tahlier et al, 2013;Zaid et al, 2021). For instance, Garg (2019) emphasized the importance of feeling sad as the most experienced emotion among all negative emotions.…”

Different physiological reactions when observing lies versus truths: Initial evidence and an intervention to enhance accuracy.

“…The tipping point framework suggests that response biases, which consistently tip in the direction of thinking and saying others are telling the truth (Levine, 2014; Levine et al, 1999), are influenced by social norms and costs associated with norm violations (ten Brinke et al, 2016). Claims to have seen someone tell a lie are tantamount to branding that person a liar (Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015), and such accusations violate social trust norms which come at a cost for the accuser (Gunderson, Pence, & ten Brinke, 2018). Impugning the moral character of another person has been shown to reflect negatively on the accuser’s own moral standing (Critcher, Inbar, & Pizarro, 2013), and signaling distrust can erode valuable social relationships (Kramer, 1999).…”