Interpreting and shaping geopolitics in Chinese media: the discourse of the ‘New style of great power relations’

Hinck, Robert S.; Manly, Jacquelyn N.; Kluver, Randolph; Norris, William J.

doi:10.1080/01292986.2016.1202990

Cited by 7 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…As the TNPS fragments into strategic TNPS identities over time, the presence and absence of visible and/or active foreign national and international actors and entities possibly functions as attribution of responsibility for failures in the Afghan peace process (Gerhards et al, 2009). This further diminishes communicative commitments and participation in transnational discourses about the future of the negotiation process, especially as great powers engage in mutual media monitoring to build foreign policy alliances and advance their foreign policy interests nationally and globally (Hinck et al, 2016). As our findings suggest, efforts to sustain a TNPS around the Taliban peace negotiations eventually succumbed to efforts by great powers to implicate national and supranational actors and entities into strategic foreign policy narratives toward Afghanistan.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Internationalizing Afghan security? Strategic narratives and transnational public sphere (dis)formation in Chinese, Russian, Afghani, and US media

Hinck

Ehrl

2022

Communication and the Public

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For most of the past two decades, the United States pursued a policy leveraging its traditional NATO partners to secure Afghanistan’s future against the Taliban with little lasting success. However, in a dramatic reversal of U.S. policy in July 2018, President Trump ordered the start of direct talks between the United States and Taliban with the goal of internationalizing Afghan security. We argue that this move in 2018 by the United States can be understood as an attempt toward forming a transnational community around Afghan security by allowing non-allied nations greater voice and agency in Afghanistan’s political future. However, current theories of transnational public sphere are unable to account for such processes. Thus, the primary aim of this study is development of a theory of transnational foreign policy sphere formation. Drawing upon Wessler et al.’s (2008) four-step process of transnational public sphere development, we conceptualize this process as one of strategic narrative (dis)alignment across and within foreign nations’ media reporting on a common issue of concern. We then use media narratives reporting on Afghanistan’s political future as an empirical case study to demonstrate our theory, by examining over 2000 news articles from 17 different Chinese, Russian, U.S., and Afghani media outlets from February 2017 to January 2020. Theoretically, our study advances research into the transnational public sphere by examining their (dis)formation over time as well as the limits and opportunities of transnational public sphere emergence outside of European contexts and on foreign policy issues among publics with very different sociopolitical interests and cultures.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Internationalizing Afghan security? Strategic narratives and transnational public sphere (dis)formation in Chinese, Russian, Afghani, and US media

Hinck

Ehrl

2022

Communication and the Public

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“…As such, strategic narratives are to be understood as an essential part of both countries' public diplomacy, outlying their position on the geopolitical chessboard, and serve as powerfully persuasive tools in the 'soft power' game of capturing the hearts and minds of both domestic and international audiences. The 'strategic narrative' framework has been applied in separate studies on official Chinese strategic narratives, as spread through the state media (Hinck et al 2016;Lams 2018), and Russian official media accounts (Hinck, Kluver & Cooley 2018), but a cross-national comparative investigation offers the added value of informing us about shared perceptions about the Self and the Other, held by both polities.…”

Section: Framing the Public Sphere: Soft Power And Strategic Narrativ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Wang (2012) demonstrated this interrelatedness between 'at home' and 'abroad' for China: 'the traditional Chinese concept of diplomacy is seen as the continuation of internal affairs' (p. 460). China's geopolitical worldview -China as a Great Power, the China Dreamis communicated to both domestic (national) and international audiences alike (Hinck et al 2016;.…”

Section: Framing the Public Sphere: Soft Power And Strategic Narrativ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Comrades? Russian and Chinese Media Representations of NATO

Lams¹,

Smaele

Coninck

et al. 2022

Europe-Asia Studies

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This article analyses perceptions of NATO in Chinese and Russian press narratives. China and Russia are often mentioned together as they share a common (geo)political position toward a perceived hegemonic West of which NATO is an evident part. We analysed frames constructing NATO at the time of the Warsaw NATO summit in 2016 as well as the underlying sources. Both countries frame NATO foremost as an aggressive organisation stuck in Cold War confrontational world views while Russia and China are open for dialogue and cooperation. The main narrative that emerges, therefore, is the self-proclaimed moral superiority of Russia and China. relatively liberal democracies tend to be China and Russia, often mentioned in one breath, such as 'EU names China and Russia as top hackers' (Rettman 2018) or 'Is PM Michel willing to start an alliance with Russia and China?' (Holslag 2018). In the remarks by President Biden on America's place in the world, China and Russia are also the first countries mentioned in his resolve to fight 'advancing authoritarianism, including the growing ambitions of China to rival the United States and the determination of Russia to damage and disrupt our democracy' (Whitehouse 2021). In the NATO 2030 report, both China and Russia are identified as 'threats' (NATO Expert Group 2020). Surely, it is understood that both the Chinese and Russian authorities view the liberal democratic system as a threat and will spare no efforts to counter liberal hegemony. Based on this shared ideological position, articulated publicly and privately in Moscow and Beijing, Sino-Russian security (and economic) cooperation has broadened and deepened since the late 1990s (Owen 2020). However, this common position toward a perceived hegemonic Western enemy does not eliminate tensions between the neighbouring countries. China's 'One Belt, One Road' initiative does not tally easily with Russia's 'Eurasian Economic Community' and the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta reportedly criticised China's expansion of influence in Central Asia as a serious threat to Russian interests. 1 Against this background of growing international distrust and shared apprehension between Russia and China about the hegemonic potential of Western liberal order, the present article sets out to examine perceptions of the foreign Other, in particular NATO, in the Russian and Chinese news media. Given press accounts originating from liberal democracies often subject these two countries to similar criticism for their authoritarian governance style and anti-Western attitudes, it begs the question whether similarities in portrayal of the foreign Other, in this case NATO, can be found in the Russian and Chinese national media outlets. This study is original by comparing the NATO portrayal of two countries, Russia and China, that are identified as geopolitical threats by NATO. It deconstructs the frames around NATO as integral parts of the broader narratives. The study analyses the news articles' lexical choices and semantic fields in addition to laying ...

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“…To the extent that its leadership style is different and has shaped new concepts such as "peaceful growth", or the "new style of great power relations", its appearance generates concern (Hinck et al, 2016).…”

Section: Sharp Power: the Dishonest Influencementioning

confidence: 99%

Globalización y poder: la consolidación de la comunicación internacional como disciplina. Artículo de revisión

Manfredi-Sánchez¹

2020

EPI

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Interpreting and shaping geopolitics in Chinese media: the discourse of the ‘New style of great power relations’

Cited by 7 publications

References 14 publications

Internationalizing Afghan security? Strategic narratives and transnational public sphere (dis)formation in Chinese, Russian, Afghani, and US media

Internationalizing Afghan security? Strategic narratives and transnational public sphere (dis)formation in Chinese, Russian, Afghani, and US media

Strategic Comrades? Russian and Chinese Media Representations of NATO

Globalización y poder: la consolidación de la comunicación internacional como disciplina. Artículo de revisión

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