Intra-Alliance Bargaining and U.S. Bosnia Policy

Abstract

Alliances are promises of cooperation, but allies typically have to bargain over what policy should be adopted when a given contingency arises. Whether this bargaining leads to collaborative outcomes and what form cooperation by allies takes have important implications for the effectiveness of an alliance. Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, the author argues, do not provide adequate explanations for this problem because they mischaracterize, or fail to come to grips with, the bargaining process at work. To redress such shortcomings, the author turns to game theory, providing a general model of intra-alliance bargaining. The model's insights are then used to interpret the historical record on U.S. Bosnia policy from 1991 until the fall of 1995. The author shows how domestic and international considerations affected the preferences and beliefs of the Bush and Clinton administrations. These led, as suggested by the model, to the U.S. tendency to avoid bargaining hard with the NATO allies and to pursue compromise strategies with them in the Bosnian crisis.

Showing Restraint, Signaling Resolve: Coalitions, Cooperation, and Crisis Bargaining

“…Serbia's relative military weakness probably also made the decision to pool on lower escalation more palatable, as predicted by Proposition , lending some plausibility to the notion that the effect of skittish partners is conditional on characteristics of the target as well as coalition members themselves. Papayoanou () also notes that moderation can explain NATO's Bosnia policy from 1991 to 1995, and the present model generalizes this insight by showing that the weakness of the target can facilitate both coalition formation and, by discouraging resolute states from revealing their type through high mobilization, the escalation of crises to war.…”

Holding Out for Concession: The Quest for Gain in the Negotiation of International Agreements

“…Following Fearon (1997) and Papayoanou (1997) we are interested in the bargaining strategies that international negotiators might adopt. Fearon (1997) compares hand-tying to the sinking of costs as a commitment tactic in international negotiations.…”

“…Fearon (1997) compares hand-tying to the sinking of costs as a commitment tactic in international negotiations. Papayoanou (1997) allows states to compromise or stand firm and examines the bargaining tactics that emerge in a game of two-sided incomplete information. In equilibrium, our negotiators can also stand firm, but, in contrast to Papayoanou, standing firm in our model is a matter of degree.…”

Influence of the Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights on the Legal Order of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Terms of Exercising Same Sex Unions

“…Complex constitutional structure is a consequence of Washington and Dayton peace agreements imposed with aim to stop the war (Steiner, 2000;Caspersen, 2004;Papayoanou, 1997;Cox, 1998;Graham, 1998;Schneckener, 2002). As the constitutional division of competencies determines, the jurisdiction for passing the law in the field of marital and family relations rests upon the entities and Brčko District.…”