Showing Restraint, Signaling Resolve: Coalitions, Cooperation, and Crisis Bargaining

Wolford, Scott

doi:10.1111/ajps.12049

Cited by 34 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…If the target believes that the coalition cannot work together, they will increase their estimate for victory. This will have important implications for pre-war bargaining and the chance for war (Reed et al, 2008; Wolford, 2014b). Through the adoption of strong command structures, coalitions can send clear signals regarding the level of commitment within the coalition.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Research into coalitions has proceeded along different lines. One line focuses upon the pre-war phase, exploring the topics of coalition formation (Henke, 2017, 2020; Kreps, 2011; Tago, 2005; Wolford, 2015; Wolford and Ritter, 2016) and different bargaining dynamics (Wolford, 2014b, 2015). A second line explores the behavior and outcomes associated with coalitions during a conflict.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Centralized command and coalition victory

Morey

2020

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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Building upon research that found that coalitions are more likely to win wars, recent work has sought to differentiate effective from ineffective coalitions. Much of this work focuses on characteristics of member states and not the coalition itself. This paper takes a first step in exploring how the structure of a coalition contributes to its performance. Specifically, coalitions vary in how much control members must transfer to the coalition. Some coalitions form weak command structures with states maintaining primary control while other coalitions form a strong centralized command. The impact of command structure on coalition performance is vital to understanding the success and failure of coalitions. Highly centralized command structures allow states to overcome the problems associated with coalition warfare and achieve victory. Empirical evidence supports this claim; the odds of victory increase as states surrender more control to the coalition. These findings provide direct advice to policy makers considering forming a coalition. The implications of this research extend to the alliance literature and the war bargaining literature, which tend to assume either that wars are dyadic or that states can seamlessly aggregate military capabilities.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Centralized command and coalition victory

Morey

2020

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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“…Bidding up the political costs of backing down from a threat (Fearon, 1994; Schultz, 1998) or expending resources on military mobilization (Lai, 2004; Slantchev, 2005) can distinguish those states willing to fight from bluffers. Yet fully separating threats appear to go unmade even when they are available (Fearon, 1997; Russett, 1963); leaders infrequently stake their political survival on crisis outcomes or engage in substantial military mobilizations (see Sechser, 2010; Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Snyder and Borghard, 2011), instead making ‘halfhearted’ or ‘watered-down’ threats that fail to clarify an ultimate willingness to fight (Byman and Waxman, 2002; Papayoanou, 1997; Wolford, 2014b). But why would a state that truly is willing to fight make an ambiguous threat when a credible one is available?…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Explanations for ambiguous threats often restrict attention to how threat strategies affect the outcome of the current crisis. They include changing public support, the provocative effects of clear threats, and the risk of emboldening one’s allies (Fearon, 1997: p. 84); preferences for flexibility (Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Snyder and Borghard, 2011) or surprise (Slantchev, 2010; Trager, 2010); and the need to placate cost-sensitive coalition partners (Wolford, 2014b). Yet these explanations overlook the reputation incentives at play in many crises, where the relevant third parties are worried about what today’s crisis reveals about a disputant’s likely behavior in future crises, and whether that makes one of today’s disputants worth balancing against.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

War and diplomacy on the world stage: Crisis bargaining before third parties

Wolford¹

2020

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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I analyze a three-actor model of crisis bargaining with two key features. First, diplomatic opposition raises the costs of war, but an informed state can avoid it by conveying restraint to a supporter. Second, the means of conveying restraint may fail to convince an enemy tempted to risk war of the informed state’s willingness to fight. I derive three results. First, war is more likely when third parties believe the informed state to be generally restrained. Second, the threat of opposition that modestly affects the costs of war discourages risky bluffing. Third, the threat of opposition that substantially raises the costs of war can lead states to mask a true willingness to fight, securing diplomatic support at the price of an elevated risk of war despite the availability of a credible signal. Building diplomatic coalitions to prevent balancing can simultaneously make credible communication that averts war both easy and unattractive.

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“…Wolford (2014Wolford ( , 2015 argues that the presence of a reluctant third-party ally can increase the credibility of a coercive threat, because signaling high resolve results in abandonment of the alliance by the third party Trager (2015Trager ( , 2017. argues that cheap talk extended deterrence threats can be credible because of the e §ect these statements have on an ally's behavior, encouraging the ally to risk precipitating a conflict that could entrap the sender.…”

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confidence: 99%

Power Shifts, Multiple Audiences and Credible Reassurance

Yoder

2020

Preprint

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It has been widely noted that rising states face great di¢culty in credibly communicating benign intentions, due to strong incentives for hostile risers to misrepresent themselves while they are still gaining power. However, virtually all literature on power shifts and reassurance relates to bilateral interactions between a rising and declining state. This article presents a formal model showing that when more than one audience is involved, rising states have an additional means of communicating their intentions through simple, costless statements. In particular, if the preferences of the receivers are su¢ciently divergent, the rising sender cannot simultaneously send cooperative public signals to both parties to avoid a balancing response. This reduces the riser's incentive to misrepresent its preferences, and lends credibility to its public statements of its intentions. The credibility of these signals is enhanced to the extent that they align with the preferences of the less-powerful receiver. The theory is illustrated by a case study of the Open Door Notes as a signal of US intentions at the turn of the 20th century, and applied to contemporary China's reassurance of Russia in the presence of the United States.

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Showing Restraint, Signaling Resolve: Coalitions, Cooperation, and Crisis Bargaining

Cited by 34 publications

References 29 publications

Centralized command and coalition victory

Centralized command and coalition victory

War and diplomacy on the world stage: Crisis bargaining before third parties

Power Shifts, Multiple Audiences and Credible Reassurance

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