Conventional models of bargaining and reassurance under incomplete information assume that actors' behavioral signals are objectively cooperative or noncooperative. Even if actors are uncertain of each other's preferences, they know what types of actions the other will view as cooperative. Yet on many real‐world issues, cooperation is subjective, and what constitutes a cooperative action is conditional on the receiver's preferences. We present a formal model showing that in these cases, two‐sided incomplete information actually incentivizes honest behavior and facilitates credible signaling. Because uncertain senders do not know whether a particular action will be interpreted as cooperative, they have little incentive to misrepresent, and instead honestly pursue their true goals. Thus, where cooperation is subjective, mutual uncertainty is “offsetting,” such that credible signals allow actors to quickly and accurately update their beliefs. We illustrate this logic through a case study of the Sino–Soviet split, and highlight the model's implications for contemporary U.S.–China relations.

No abstract

Both advocates and opponents of retrenchment have treated it as an undesirable, last-ditch strategy for states that have already experienced severe decline. This article presents a formal model that identifies an unrecognized benefit of retrenchment: It can provide declining states with valuable information about rising states' future intentions. By removing constraints over the behavior of rising states in a particular region, a declining state can induce hostile risers to attempt revision of the regional order. This, in turn, makes a riser's cooperative behavior more credible as a signal of benign intentions, allowing the decliner to oppose hostile types while accommodating benign ones. In contrast to the existing focus on retrenchment as a desperate strategy taken from a position of weakness, this article suggests that the informational benefits of retrenchment are greatest when it is undertaken early, from a position of strength.

IN HIS SEMINAL WORK Domination and the Arts of Resistance, James Scott shows how groups in subordinate power relationships, such as slaves, are often unable to express their dissatisfaction with the actions of a dominant group overtly. 1 This constitutes proscribed discourse, or statements that would incur punishment if observed by the dominant group. Instead, Scott argues, dissatisfied subordinates maintain "hidden transcripts"-covert communications among themselves that are opaque to the dominant group-to effectively coordinate challenges to the status quo in secret. Such communications entail culturally informed symbols

How can declining states reliably infer the intentions of rising states? One prominent line of argument maintains that because declining states face intractable uncertainty about rising states’ future intentions, preventive war is often unavoidable even between states with truly compatible goals. This article presents a dynamic model of reassurance in which actors are uncertain whether or not their interests conflict. The model shows that by adopting a hedging strategy of limited containment short of war, declining states can reduce risers’ incentives to send dishonest cooperative signals. This, in turn, makes cooperation more credible as a signal of risers’ benign intentions. Moreover, these signals are sufficiently informative to dissuade the decliner from escalating to preventive war even under large power shifts. Thus, although power shifts promote limited competition among states with compatible goals, preventive war rationally occurs only in a bargaining context when the riser’s goals are known to be incompatible.