Intra‐firm Wage Dispersion and Firm Performance – Is There a Uniform Relationship?

Jirjahn, Uwe; Kraft, Kornelius

doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.2007.00370.x

Cited by 51 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 61 publications

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“…Additionally, a works council can increase trust between the employer and the workforce (Freeman and Lazear, 1995;Addison et al, 2001;Frege, 2002;Jirjahn and Kraft, 2007;Jirjahn, 2010 Similar, such trust considerations may also reduce ratchet effect problems (Laffont and Tirole, 1988;Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003;Jirjahn, 2010). Employees receive payments for their performance.…”

Section: Theoretical Considerations and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Detecting an uneven pay, the works council may again threaten to cancel cooperation. Jirjahn and Kraft (2007) state that works councils aim to reduce the wage dispersion, since it reflects the heterogeneity of the employees. However, works councilors may also consider the interests of male employees since employment rates of women are lower and male employees accumulate the majority in many firms.…”

Section: Hypothesis 2: Employees' Job Satisfaction Is Increased By Womentioning

confidence: 99%

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Works councils, wages and job satisfaction

Grund

Schmitt

2011

Applied Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.IZA Discussion Paper No. 5464 January 2011 ABSTRACTWorks Councils, Wages, and Job Satisfaction

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Section: Theoretical Considerations and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Hypothesis 2: Employees' Job Satisfaction Is Increased By Womentioning

confidence: 99%

Works councils, wages and job satisfaction

Grund

Schmitt

2011

Applied Economics

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“…The design of compensation systems is a reflection of a firm's corporate governance and has been the focus of much research in the U.S. and other developed economies. 2 This research has examined, among other things, whether pay depends on performance (Murphy, 1985;Jensen and Murphy, 1990;Core et al, 1999;Conyon and Murphy, 2000;Bebchuk and Fried, 2006); the role of corporate governance, including board structure and ownership, on compensation (Cheung et al, 2005;Core et al, 1999;Bebchuk and Fried, 2006); and whether behavioral theories (e.g., tournament theory or relative depravation theory) can help explain the disparity between the top manager's pay and the compensation of other managers and workers (e.g., Bloom, 1999;Bognanno, 2001;Main et al, 1993;Jirjahn and Kraft, 2007;Lazear, 1991;Rajgopal and Srinivasan, 2008;Bebchuk et al, 2008). In this paper, we revisit these questions using data from China.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Justifying top management pay in a transitional economy

Firth¹,

Leung

Rui

2010

Journal of Empirical Finance

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We investigate some aspects of top management pay in China's listed firms. We find positive pay and performance sensitivities and elasticities for top executives. In terms of magnitude, these sensitivities are similar to those reported in U.S. firms during the 1970s. However, the pay and performance relation is slightly weaker for firms located in less developed provinces. We also find that the pay disparities between top managers and employees are positively related to a firm's performance. Thus, it appears that any deviation away from a manager-worker compensation norm has to be justified by superior firm performance. In additional analyses, we find that managers' perquisites are not related to performance.

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“…Indeed, Jirjahn and Kraft (2007) provide evidence that the productivity effect of differential rewards is stronger when pay determination is less arbitrary.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Variable Pay, Industrial Relations and Foreign Ownership: Evidence from Germany

Heywood

Jirjahn

2013

Brit J Industrial Rel

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We use a representative sample of German establishments to show that those with foreign ownership are more likely to use performance appraisal, profit sharing and employee share ownership than are those with domestic ownership. Moreover, we show that works councils are associated with an increased probability of using each of the three practices when under domestic ownership but not when under foreign ownership. These results inform the on-going debate over institutional duality, the extent to which foreign firms adopt uniform practices independent of local institutions and the extent to which they adapt and participate in those local institutions. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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Intra‐firm Wage Dispersion and Firm Performance – Is There a Uniform Relationship?

Cited by 51 publications

References 61 publications

Works councils, wages and job satisfaction

Works councils, wages and job satisfaction

Justifying top management pay in a transitional economy

Variable Pay, Industrial Relations and Foreign Ownership: Evidence from Germany

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