Variable Pay, Industrial Relations and Foreign Ownership: Evidence from Germany

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We use a representative sample of German establishments to show that those with foreign ownership are more likely to use performance appraisal, profit sharing and employee share ownership than are those with domestic ownership. Moreover, we show that works councils are associated with an increased probability of using each of the three practices when under domestic ownership but not when under foreign ownership. These results inform the on-going debate over institutional duality, the extent to which foreign firms adopt uniform practices independent of local institutions and the extent to which they adapt and participate in those local institutions. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

Nonunion Employee Representation: Theory and the German Experience With Mandated Works Councils

“…The estimated coefficients suggest that works councils have a positive influence on productivity only in domestic‐owned, but not in foreign‐owned establishments. Heywood and Jirjahn () analyze the influence of works councils and foreign ownership on the use of performance appraisal systems, profit sharing, and employee share ownership. They find the same pattern of results for each incentive scheme.…”

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