Intrinsic imperfection of self-differencing single-photon detectors harms the security of high-speed quantum cryptography systems

Jiang, Mu-Sheng; Sun, Shi-Hai; Tang, Guang-Zhao; Ma, Xiang-Chun; Li, Chunyan; Liang, Lin-Mei

doi:10.1103/physreva.88.062335

Cited by 31 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Therefore it is crucial that security proofs are extended to accommodate the imperfections of the real QKD devices. Any unaccounted imperfection constitutes a so-called 'side-channel', which can be exploited by Eve to compromise the security of the system [7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decoy-state quantum key distribution with a leaky source

2016

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In recent years, there has been a great effort to prove the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) with a minimum number of assumptions. Besides its intrinsic theoretical interest, this would allow for larger tolerance against device imperfections in the actual implementations. However, even in this device-independent scenario, one assumption seems unavoidable, that is, the presence of a protected space devoid of any unwanted information leakage in which the legitimate parties can privately generate, process and store their classical data. In this paper we relax this unrealistic and hardly feasible assumption and introduce a general formalism to tackle the information leakage problem in most of existing QKD systems. More specifically, we prove the security of optical QKD systems using phase and intensity modulators in their transmitters, which leak the setting information in an arbitrary manner. We apply our security proof to cases of practical interest and show key rates similar to those obtained in a perfectly shielded environment. Our work constitutes a fundamental step forward in guaranteeing implementation security of quantum communication systems.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decoy-state quantum key distribution with a leaky source

2016

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“…By illuminating the APD with CW light of sufficient intensity, it is possible to deterministically produce an avalanche with each gate, thereby forcing a complete cancellation of avalanche signals and bringing the detection count rate to zero. 13,26 Assuming identical avalanche amplitudes, the detection probability (P det ) can be simulated using…”

Section: Principle Of the Self-differencing Circuitmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Attacks on single photon detectors have attracted significant research attention, [10][11][12][13] because they are central to a QKD system and are naturally exposed to Eve's optical manipulation through the quantum channel. In the so-called blinding attacks, Eve forces the receiver's, known as Bob, semiconductor avalanche photodiodes (APDs) to lose their single photon sensitivity by injecting strong laser light into the quantum channel.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Setting best practice criteria for self-differencing avalanche photodiodes in quantum key distribution

Koehler-Sidki

Dynes

Lucamarini

et al. 2017

Quantum Information Science and Technology III

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In recent years, the security of avalanche photodiodes as single photon detectors for quantum key distribution has been subjected to much scrutiny. The most prominent example of this surrounds the vulnerability of such devices to blinding under strong illumination. We focus on self-differencing avalanche photodiodes, single photon detectors that have demonstrated count rates exceeding 1 GCounts/s resulting in secure key rates over 1 MBit/s. These detectors use a passive electronic circuit to cancel any periodic signals thereby enhancing detection sensitivity. However this intrinsic feature can be exploited by adversaries to gain control of the devices using illumination of a moderate intensity. Through careful experimental examinations, we define here a set of criteria for these detectors to avoid such attacks.

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“…Subsequently, these keys enable secure communication and authentication. Non-ideal apparatuses, especially single-photon detectors with imperfections, have been exploited to carry out side-channel attacks against practical QKD [9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19], although the QKD is unbreakable in theory.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantum secure direct communication based on single-photon Bell-state measurement

Long

2020

New J. Phys.

108

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Security loopholes exploiting the flaws of practical apparatus, especially non-ideal photon detectors, are pressing issues in practical quantum communication. We propose a simple quantum secure direct communication protocol based on single-photon Bell-state measurement and remove side-channel attacks on photon detectors. This quantum communication protocol in principle works in a deterministic way, and it does not require the two-photon interference of photons from independent sources. The single-photon Bell-state measurement with a unity efficiency can be constructed with only linear optics, which significantly simplifies its experimental implementation. Furthermore, we prove that our quantum secure direct communication protocol is immune to general detector-side-channel attacks.

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Intrinsic imperfection of self-differencing single-photon detectors harms the security of high-speed quantum cryptography systems

Cited by 31 publications

References 27 publications

Decoy-state quantum key distribution with a leaky source

Decoy-state quantum key distribution with a leaky source

Setting best practice criteria for self-differencing avalanche photodiodes in quantum key distribution

Quantum secure direct communication based on single-photon Bell-state measurement

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