Introduction

Media Pluralism and Democratic Consolidation: A Recipe for Success?

“…Under the former regime, private TV licenses were acquired through nepotism and programming was forcibly apolitical in nature; following the uprising, audio-visual ownership was opened to competitive private investments. The High Independent Authority for Audiovisual Communication ( Haute Autorité Independante de le Communication Audiovisuelle or HAICA for short) was established in 2013 with overarching powers to oversee both public and private media, including approving new operating licenses, producing license specifications ( cahiers de charge ) for public broadcasting outlets, and ensuring the plurality of the media's output, especially in political programs and during electoral campaigns (el Issawi 2012, 2016). The effective establishment of the HAICA was met with strong resistance from the political sphere and media barons.…”

How can we Agree on Anything in This Environment? Tunisian Media, Transition and Elite Compromises: A View From Parliament

“…The role of television and real-life networks was far greater (Aouragh and Alexander 2011). As Kahlaoui (2013) makes clear, “the role of the internet and social media, in particular, in the Tunisian revolution has been exaggerated by Western media.” Following this, it became important to analyze how traditional media operated at the time of the revolts and in their aftermath because easy access to internet was not widespread and because many citizens still get their news from radio, television, and newspapers or magazines (El-Issawi 2016).…”

“…A number of scholars (CIRS 2016; El-Issawi 2016) have underlined the divisive role of the media in the Arab world, and in his 2015 seminal article Lynch best summed up the scholarly consensus: “rather than constituting new public spheres for the negotiation of new identities and institutions, or acting as watchdogs on the emergent regimes, the media in most Arab states contributed to social polarization, popular discontent, and the resurgence of old regimes.” Lynch continued his analysis by outlining the way in which the media played a destructive polarizing role that fundamentally undermined the chances of success of the processes of regime change in countries that had rid themselves of a dictator. He argued convincingly that “transnational television bec(ame) a weapon for proxy wars by regional powers, national media (were) captured by old elites and private interests, and social media encoura(ged) polarization and informational clustering.”…”

“…The retrenchment of authoritarian rule in Egypt, Bahrain, and Morocco and the explosion of civil conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Yemen are testimony to the broad failure of democratization. Although the media are not the only actor responsible for this state of affairs, most analyses of countries where a transitional process was initiated converge on the finding that their role has contributed to such failures (El-Issawi 2013 on Libya; Alazzany and Sharp 2014 on Yemen; Lynch et al 2017 on Egypt). The findings from the other post-uprisings transitional cases lead to the issue of the “paradoxical” success of the Tunisian transition.…”

“…While journalists at times apologized subsequently for their mistakes, the reality is that many media outlets had an ideological approach to politics that clearly intended to undermine a key actor in the transition. 4 In short, undermining Ennahda was the ultimate objective (El-Issawi 2012). The Islamists responded to this mediatic attack by setting up of favorable media outlets—the TV channels Al Kalam , 5 Al Zaitouna , 6 and Al Moutawasset 7 —or by attempting to gain influence in existing media such as Hannibal TV.…”