Introduction. Analytic versus continental: arguments on the methods and value of philosophy

Chase, James

doi:10.1017/upo9781844654789.001

Cited by 4 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…As I have shown in my discussion of his analysis of Heidegger’s sentences, at least part of Carnap’s attack on Heidegger concerns his account of logical syntax, which has been seen as detachable from the verificationist theory of meaning in which it is couched in 1931 (see, e.g., Friedman 1987, 539–40). When it comes to Heidegger’s sentences, Carnap’s central criticism is directed against the elementary misuse of quantification they involve (see Glock 2008, 118; Chase and Reynolds 2011, 28). The detected misuse of the existential quantifier could be understood as standing on its own as a point of criticism against Heidegger, detachable from the verificationism on which Carnap’s overall stance relies.…”

Section: The Contestability Of Carnap’s 1931 Verificationist Metametaphysicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unresolvable Disagreements in Carnap’s Metametaphysics

Vrahimis

2021

Metaphilosophy

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Carnap’s 1931 attack against metaphysics notoriously utilises Heidegger’s work to exemplify the meaninglessness of metaphysical pseudo‐statements. This paper interprets Carnap’s metametaphysics as concerned with delimiting theoretical dialogue in such a manner as to exclude unresolvable disagreements. It puts forth a revised version of Carnap’s argument against the viability of metaphysics, by setting aside his stronger claims that rely on verificationism and focusing instead on his account of metaphysical claims as mere expressions of what he calls “Lebensgefühl,” or a general attitude towards life. Such attitudes, Carnap argues, are unsuitable objects of theoretical dialogue, insofar as disagreements that concern them are unresolvable. Carnap thus recommends abandoning the attempt to resolve metaphysical disagreements as if they were theoretical. As long as it does not enter into unresolvable disagreements, art, rather than theory, is the appropriate medium for expressing Lebensgefühl.

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Section: The Contestability Of Carnap’s 1931 Verificationist Metametaphysicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unresolvable Disagreements in Carnap’s Metametaphysics

Vrahimis

2021

Metaphilosophy

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“…We suggest that to understand the issues raised by Koenderink's opinion piece we need first to compare 'phenomenology' and 'cognitive science' (broadly construed), since Koenderink's attack seems to be on cognitive science from a phenomenological or 'continental' stance. Now, both these paradigms are active research programmes, running somewhat in parallel and frequently described as opposing traditions, subject to mutual mistrust and irreconcilable opinions (eg Albertazzi, 2001;Chase & Reynolds, 2011). Holders of each view can indeed find their opponents' position irrational and incomprehensible, as Koenderink (2001aKoenderink ( , 2002Koenderink ( , 2014 has frequently noted from the phenomenological side.…”

Section: Idealism Is Alive and Well And Living In Perceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Phenomenology and cognitive science are subdivisions within an even broader context, the global contrast between 'continental' and 'Western' or 'anglophone' analytic philosophy (eg Chase & Reynolds, 2011). Is there scope for a synthesis here too?…”

Section: Continental or Analytic?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Idealism and Materialism in Perception

Rose

Brown

2015

Perception

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Koenderink (2014, Perception, 43, 1-6) has said most Perception readers are deluded, because they believe an 'All Seeing Eye' observes an objective reality. We trace the source of Koenderink's assertion to his metaphysical idealism, and point to two major weaknesses in his position-namely, its dualism and foundationalism. We counter with arguments from modern philosophy of science for the existence of an objective material reality, contrast Koenderink's enactivism to his idealism, and point to ways in which phenomenology and cognitive science are complementary and not mutually exclusive.

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“…Even (and perhaps especially!) analytic philosophy has inherited this view, with its emphasis on universality and detachment from the contingent details of experience (see Chase & Reynolds (2011)). Philosophical success is still connected with clarity, insight, and illumination even when the philosopher is focused on the logical connections between abstract propositions with no obvious practical application.…”

Section: Conclusion: Philosophy Of Religion and Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Seeing the Dao: conceptual metaphors and the philosophy of religion

Harrison¹

2015

Rel. Stud.

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This article suggests that different philosophical traditions have developed and matured around particular conceptual metaphors. It proposes that conceptual metaphor theory provides a useful tool with which to think about different world philosophical traditions, as it can reveal the deep structure of networks of ideas. Conceptual metaphors are not just linguistic devices; rather they organize whole networks of thought, experience, and activity. This idea is explored and special attention paid to the role of those conceptual metaphors that structure ways of thinking about knowledge within Western, Indian, and East Asian traditions. The article concludes with some reflections on the implications of this approach for inter-cultural philosophy of religion.

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Introduction. Analytic versus continental: arguments on the methods and value of philosophy

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

Unresolvable Disagreements in Carnap’s Metametaphysics

Unresolvable Disagreements in Carnap’s Metametaphysics

Idealism and Materialism in Perception

Seeing the Dao: conceptual metaphors and the philosophy of religion

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