Introduction: Empathy and Collective Intentionality—The Social Philosophy of Edith Stein

Abstract

Two issues have been at center stage in recent social philosophy, both in the analytic and the continental tradition: on the one hand, the nature of interpersonal understanding, or empathy; on the other hand, the possibility and nature of collective intentionality, shared emotions, and group agency. Indeed, there are not many who have investigated more thoroughly both these issues, and, even if not quite explicitly, their complex interrelation, than the philosopher Edith Stein . This special issue explores Edith Stein's social philosophy, especially as expounded in her phenomenological writings from the 1910s and 1920s. In particular, it will investigate the systematic links between Stein's pioneering work on empathy (Stein 1917), and her less known but certainly not less original theory of collective intentionality and community (Stein 1922).One of the main aims of this special issue is to re-describe, re-contextualize, and critically assess Stein's intriguing phenomenology of social reality in contemporary terms, and, specifically, in relation to the relevant current trends in the philosophy of (collective) emotions, social ontology, social cognition research, social psychology, and political philosophy.If we look at the contemporary philosophical landscape, the issue of empathy and collectivity are typically dealt with separately from one another. Moreover, in stark contrast to Stein-and many other early phenomenologists such as Husserl, Gurwitsch, Scheler, or Walther, who all worked in such diverse areas within social philosophy as social cognition, social ontology or social epistemology, and with a few notable contemporary exceptions (Butterfill 2013; Tomasello 2014; Zahavi & Thomas Szanto

Graded Empathy: A Neuro-Phenomenological Hypothesis

“…In these cases, the nature of our relationship drives interpersonal understanding that goes beyond an as if scenario. (7) maintains that at this phase of empathy, the other's expression is given to me as an intentional object that I can reflect upon (91). We argue that tertiary empathy unfolds in two types of encounters that are colored by intense group interest: those that do not necessitate mutual emphatic awareness, and those that rely on it.…”

“…As [(88), p. 92] puts it, "The phenomenologists would consequently reject the view that imitation, emotional contagion or mimicry should be the paradigm of empathy." This approach does not necessarily rule out the possibility that empathic understanding extends by my interest in the other subject (91). Indeed, it is precisely because empathic processes are other-directed that empathy can increase by virtue of the nature of our we-relationship (22); the more I am emotionally attached to the person I attend to, the more I am interested in their mental states, and correspondingly empathy amplifies [for the impact of emotions on social cognition see in (92)…”

Shared emotions: a Steinian proposal

“…As several commentators (Caminada 2015;Szanto 2015;19 Vendrell Ferran (2015), however, has shown that emotions play a crucial role in Stein's accounts of empathy and communal experience. 20 For a detailed discussion of Stein's work, see the contributions to the special issue of Human Studies edited by Szanto and Moran (2015a;Taipale 2015;Vendrell Ferran 2015;Szanto 2015;Burns 2015;Caminada 2015;Jardine 2015). 21 It is important to note that feelings (Gefühle) and feeling (Fühlen) are not two distinct intentional acts.…”

Intentionality, Value Disclosure, and Constitution: Stein’s Model

“…7 The second section analyzes two facets of the claim that emotions are intentional states responsible for 3 Cf. Zahavi 2014 andSzanto andMoran 2015. 4 For an overview: Wobbe 1997 andVendrell Ferran 2008 5 Some recent works on Stein are imbued precisely with this spirit: Calcagno 2007 andLebech 2009.…”