Phenomenological approaches suggest that the bodily presence of others has a profound influence on the experience of social spaces. This intimate relationship is particularly evident in mental disorders. Investigations into the nature of intersubjectivity in various pathologies indicate that modifications to the capacity for social perception play a key role in determining the manners in which the social space is experienced and felt. This paper aims to examine the interviewing relation of social perception and the experience of space and its consequences in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). This is done through a phenomenologically informed analysis of the functioning of social perception in ASD. Our account proposes that the atypical socio-perceptual patterns exhibited by people with autism significantly reduce the capacity to grasp the context of the situation, which facilitates and intensifies negative feelings that are intertwined with the experience of social spaces. This novel understanding draws on the idea that ASD involves a fundamental difficulty to establish a gestalt perception of social scenes. The evidence we discuss suggests that this anomaly in the operation of social perception also modulates the experience of the social space. Failing to perceive the wholeness of the situation means that people with autism often experience the social space as unfamiliar, confusing, uncertain, and unsafe, rather than feeling familiar and understood in the embodied presence of others. As a result, autistic subjects may experience difficulty evaluating the outcomes of hazardous circumstances, which poses a risk to their well-being, particularly in borderline situations. This suggestion is elaborated through the tragic occurrences that led to the killing of Eyad al-Hallaq, a 32-year-old Palestinian with autism.

The neuroscience of empathy has enormously expanded in the past two decades, thereby making instrumental progress for the understanding of neural substrates involved in affective and cognitive aspects of empathy. Yet, these conclusions have relied on ultrasimplified tasks resulting in the affective/cognitive dichotomy that was often modeled and overemphasized in pathological, developmental, and genetic studies of empathy. As such, the affective/cognitive model of empathy could not straightforwardly accommodate and explain the recent surge of neuroscientific data obtained from studies employing naturalistic approaches and intergroup conditions. Inspired by phenomenological philosophy, this article paves the way for a new scientific perspective on empathy that breaks thorough the affective/cognitive dichotomy. This neuro-phenomenological account leans on phenomenological analyses and can straightforwardly explain recent neuroscience data. It emphasizes the dynamic, subjective, and piecemeal features of empathic experiences and unpicks the graded nature of empathy. The graded empathy hypothesis postulates that attending to others' expressions always facilitates empathy, but the parametric modulation in the levels of the empathic experience varies as a function of one's social interest (e.g., via intergroup or inter-personal cues) in the observed other. Drawing on multiple resources that integrate neuroscience with phenomenology, we describe the potential of this graded framework in an era of real-life experimentation. By wearing lenses of neuro-phenomenology, this original perspective can change the way empathy is considered.

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