Introduction to the Special Issue. Civil Society in Ukraine: Building on Euromaidan Legacy

Abstract

The idea of this Special Issue appeared in early 2014, when the heat of the fire on Kyiv's Independence Square had not fully cooled down and when many civic activists and newborn volunteers had turned their ceaseless energy to yet another fire first in Crimea and then in Eastern Ukraine. The events that seemingly put the state of Ukraine on the brink of its very existence were evolving too fast, but civil society's response to them was no less prompt and adaptive. Volunteers and activists were trying on new roles each day as they were helping those escaping persecution, repression and hostilities, equipping and maintaining those who fought with weapons or joining their ranks, developing reform agenda and drafting legislative proposals. What seemed astounding back then, and still does today, was how those thousands of volunteers and millions of "ordinary citizens" who mobilized to support new civic initiatives took over the functions of the weak and nearly collapsed state eroded by corruption, nepotism, the neglect of its citizens and of the country's national interests. Challenging a post-Soviet monster disguised behind the mask of electoral democracy and market economy, citizens were bringing in a new social contract based on trust and solidarity on which a new state could be built. The speed of events and the scale of civil society engagement precluded any long-term comprehensive analysis, yet researchers' zeal to reflect upon what looked as a tectonic move in Ukraine's political and social development took over. At first, our idea was to co-author an article examining civil society's role in a post-Euromaidan Ukraine, but soon enough the task became too big. The initial 1 In the title of this Special Issue and introduction article, as well as throughout the contributions, we speak of "Euromaidan" to refer to the popular protests that took place in Ukraine in November 2013-February 2014. We use this trope as the most recognizable to the reader and for consistency across the articles only. We are aware that the term "Euromaidan" narrows down the understanding of the events to only one narrative. It is not our intention to automatically or collectively sign up to it.

Distributed humanitarianism

“…Many of the aid chains inside Ukraine were built on webs of acquaintance and partnership: one group we interviewed was based inside a labor union, another was made up of anarchists who had worked on other political projects together. And, of course, many of the aid groups in Ukraine were based on groups formed in 2013–14 during the Maidan Uprising and the subsequent Russian invasion of the Donbas, when 23 percent of the Ukrainian population was engaged in volunteer aid (Burlyuk et al., 2017; Channell‐Justice, 2022; Lavrinenko, 2020; Uehling, 2023; Zarembo, 2017). As Puglisi (2018, p. 3) argues, “The large‐scale mobilization of Ukrainian society is … arguably Euromaidan's and its tragic aftermath's most far‐reaching legacy.”…”

Influential allies and grassroots movement mobilization: Ukraine’s Maidan, 2013–2014

“…Established CSOs were also influential allies within the Maidan mobilizing structures. This finding contributes to the ongoing debates on the 'weakness' and 'strength' of Ukrainian civil society in general (Burlyuk et al, 2017), and in particular its ability to channel popular discontent (Way, 2014). Activists lacked resources, and a wide and interconnected array of formal and informal ties among them made it easier for local Maidans to form.…”

“…Although pre-Euromaidan civil society in Ukraine was initially characterized by low levels of participation in CSOs, rooted in a legacy of mistrust caused by communistcontrolled institutions (Howard, 2003), informal groups and local initiatives were surprisingly durable (Burlyuk et al, 2017). This ensured the continuity of mobilization frames in Ukraine's multiple contentious episodes since the 1980s (Onuch, 2014a).…”

Ukraine at war: Baseline identity and social construction

“…Shore (2018) analysed the Maidan as an ideational and moral revolution, as did Wynnyckyj (2019), whose multi‐factoral analysis included national liberation and economic modernisation and the rise of heterarchy and self‐help. These were the years of the rise of Ukrainian civil society (Burlyuk & Shapovalova, 2018), at a time when the state was distrusted and both too strong (coercive) and too weak (too much state capture and corruption).…”