2016 International Conference on Information Networking (ICOIN) 2016
DOI: 10.1109/icoin.2016.7427089
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Intrusion detection system based on the analysis of time intervals of CAN messages for in-vehicle network

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Cited by 362 publications
(192 citation statements)
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“…Recently, there has been some research for IDS to detect attacks targeted on the vehicles. For example, Song et al proposed a detection model based on time interval analysis of CAN data [1], and Lee et al presented a method to detect intrusion by monitoring the time interval of the request and response of CAN data [2].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Recently, there has been some research for IDS to detect attacks targeted on the vehicles. For example, Song et al proposed a detection model based on time interval analysis of CAN data [1], and Lee et al presented a method to detect intrusion by monitoring the time interval of the request and response of CAN data [2].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As a result, injecting or dropping CAN frames should evidently increase the entropy of in-vehicle network and in turn expose an intrusion. Song et al [18] worked in a similar fashion but used the time interval between CAN frames to inspect suspicious frames. Taylor et al [14] emphasized on the data transmitted on CAN bus and proposed a recurrent neural network (RNN) based anomaly detector.…”
Section: Background and Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hence, there is an urgent need for securing CAN buses. Security solutions for CAN can be broadly classified into schemes that add cryptographic measures to the CAN bus [8]- [10], [18] and anomaly-based IDSs that 1) analyze the traffic on the CAN bus including message contents [19]- [21], timing/frequency [15], [22]- [25], entropy [26], and survival rates [27], 2) exploit the physical characteristics of ECUs extracted from in-vehicle sensing data [28]- [30] or measurements [11], [13], [14], [31], [32], and 3) exploit the characteristics of the CAN protocol, such as the remote frame [33]. Compared to the CAN traffic, it is more difficult for adversaries to imitate the physical characteristics of ECUs, such as the mean squared error of voltage measurements [11].…”
Section: Accumulated Offsetmentioning
confidence: 99%