Intuitions about cases as evidence (for how we should think)

Andow, James

doi:10.1080/0020174x.2020.1767199

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…Recently Andow (2020) proposed a normative interpretation of the method of cases which is slightly different from that one described above. According to him, at least some instances of this method might be interpreted as arguments for how we should think about a target concept.…”

Section: Normative and Descriptive Argumentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reference the untouchable. On the limits of revising concepts using the method of cases

Sękowski

2022

Synthese

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The paper investigates to what extent the method of cases can be interpreted as either a descriptive or a normative enterprise. I demonstrate that although most instances of the method of cases in most philosophical theories could be interpreted as being intended to either discover or revise the meaning of their target concepts, within a theory of reference this method cannot be used to shift the meaning of the concept of reference. The reason for this is that intuitions of extension in a theory of reference constitute a set of data that needs to be explained, while in most other philosophical theories they could either be abandoned in favor of intuitions of intension or serve as a criterion for the adequacy of the proposed definition of the target concept. This feature of a theory of reference is caused by the fact that an implicit understanding of what reference is in a theory of reference is usually assumed and is out of discussion. In effect, the claim in paradigmatic instances of the method of cases within a theory of reference does not concern whether an expression does or does not refer in particular cases, but rather what the reference of a certain expression is, and therefore it cannot be justified by intuitions of intension.

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Section: Normative and Descriptive Argumentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reference the untouchable. On the limits of revising concepts using the method of cases

Sękowski

2022

Synthese

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“…It is important to note that philosophical concepts, even if homonymous with everyday concepts, could be slightly different from them because they serve specific purposes 5 Let me note that the idea that the Method of Cases might be concerned as aimed at revising our concepts is not brand new. For example, Andow (2020) has argued in favour of such a view. His account however differs from the one presented above, since Andow does not agree with the Deutsch's main claim about the justification for main claims in the Method of Cases, and does not focus on the dialectical role of intuitions of intension (for discussion of Andow's stance see Sękowski 2023).…”

Section: Intuitions Of Intension In Revision G-groundsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Concept Revision, Concept Application and the Role of Intuitions in Gettier Cases

Sękowski

2022

Episteme

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The aim of the paper is to determine the role of intuitions in Gettier cases. Critics of the Method of Cases argue that arguments developed within this method contain a premise that is justified by its intuitiveness; they also argue that intuitions are unreliable sources of evidence. By contrast, Max Deutsch argues that this critique is unsound since intuitions do not serve as evidence for premises. In Gettier cases, an intuitive premise is justified by other arguments called G-Grounds. I propose a different view on the role of intuition in Gettier cases. I introduce a distinction between concept-revision arguments and concept-application arguments. On the basis of this distinction and Craig's and Spicer's distinction between intuitions of intension and intuitions of extension, I show that (1) intuitions of extension do not serve as evidence for any G-Grounds; (2) intuitions of intension do play an evidential role for all G-Grounds, but (3) in the case of G-Grounds which are used as concept-application arguments, they are a poor source of evidence, while (4) in the case of G-Grounds used as concept-revision arguments, they could be a reliable source of evidence if they are intuitions of intension of a speaker immersed in philosophical discourse.

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Metaphilosophy Armed with Original Texts: A Corpus Study on the Intuition-talk in Theory of Reference

Sękowski

2024

Philosophia

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The paper engages in two metaphilosophical disputes. The first concerns the importance of studying original texts to establish the methods used by philosophers. The second addresses the role of intuitions in philosophical arguments. In this paper, I argue that a close reading of original texts is crucial for the methodological dispute on the role of intuitions in philosophy. I refer to the critique of this stance proposed by Landes, discuss it, and justify my claim by presenting the results and benefits of a corpus study concerning the practice known as “intuition-talk” in the theory of reference. The study consists of an in-depth qualitative analysis of this practice with respect to four parameters: indicators of intuition-talk, the subject of that talk, the mode of that talk (whether intuition-talk is used by formulating a judgment on a particular case or ascribing a general property to a given phenomenon), and the issue of whether intuitive claims are supported by arguments. I discuss the results, their consequences, and outline some challenges that need to be addressed in future studies conducted within the proposed approach and thereby demonstrate why such a study, focused on the content of original texts, should be seen as metaphilosophically valuable.

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Intuitions about cases as evidence (for how we should think)

Cited by 5 publications

References 59 publications

Reference the untouchable. On the limits of revising concepts using the method of cases

Reference the untouchable. On the limits of revising concepts using the method of cases

Concept Revision, Concept Application and the Role of Intuitions in Gettier Cases

Metaphilosophy Armed with Original Texts: A Corpus Study on the Intuition-talk in Theory of Reference

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