Intuitions, reflective judgments, and experimental philosophy

Hannon, Michael

doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1412-1

Cited by 21 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 57 publications

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“…There are other ways that participants might have misinterpreted “ought” which could affect the conclusions drawn from these studies. For example, Hannon () argues, specifically in the experiments performed by Chituc et al (), that participants could have wrongly interpreted “ought” as “ought to have.” Hence, when participants judged that an agent “ought” to perform an act, they responded affirmatively in the sense that the agent “ought to have” performed the act before the agent was unable to perform the act. If this is the case, the perceived inability of an agent might be relevant to the judgment that “A still ought to X,” but it might be irrelevant to the judgment that “A ought to have done X when A was able to X.” Hannon tested this hypothesis using the same high‐blame scenario as Chituc et al () in which an agent intentionally stays at home so that he cannot fulfill his promise to meet a friend.…”

Section: Objections To Empirical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, because participants were asked to choose one option (“still ought,” “ought to have,” or neither), it is unclear whether some participants who selected the “ought to have” interpretation also believed that the agent still had an obligation after the agent was no longer able to keep the promise (see also Sinnott‐Armstrong, ). Second, in response to the follow‐up question, a significant percentage of participants (34%) held that the agent “still ought” to perform the act that he is unable to perform (Hannon, ). Defenders of OIC must explain why some people still make both “still ought” and inability judgments in certain situations without appeal to a mistaken interpretation of “ought.”…”

Section: Objections To Empirical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Recent experimental work on “ought” implies “can”

Semler

Henne

2019

Philosophy Compass

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While philosophers generally accept some version of the principle "ought" implies "can," recent work in experimental philosophy and cognitive science provides evidence against a presupposition or a conceptual entailment from "ought"to "can." Here, we review some of this evidence, its effect on particular formulations of the principle, and future directions for cognitive scientists and philosophers.

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Section: Objections To Empirical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Objections To Empirical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Recent experimental work on “ought” implies “can”

Semler

Henne

2019

Philosophy Compass

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“…While these objections fail to undermine such arguments in the way their proponents have claimed (e.g. Nadelhoffer and Nahmias 2007;Sytsma and Livengood 2015), they do suggest that ordinary speakers' intuitions must fulfill three additional conditions in order to be relevant to moral semantics and philosophical moral psychology (see Hannon 2018;Pölzler 2018aPölzler , 2018c.…”

Section: Empirical Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An empirical argument against moral non-cognitivism

Pölzler

Wright

2020

Inquiry

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According to non-cognitivism, moral sentences and judgements do not aim to represent how things morally are. This paper presents an empirical argument against this view. We begin by showing that non-cognitivism entails the prediction that after some reflection competent ordinary speakers' semantic intuitions favor that moral sentences and judgements do not aim to represent how things morally are. At first sight, this prediction may seem to have been confirmed by previous research on folk metaethics. However, a number of methodological worries lead us to doubt this interpretation. We, therefore, conducted a psychological study that alleviates these worries as far as possible. It turned out that competent ordinary speakers' reflective semantic intuitions dominantly fail to favor that moral sentences do not aim to represent how things morally are. This challenge to non-cognitivism is defended and supplemented by considering deflationary theories of moral truth and middle ground theories in the cognitivism/non-cognitivism debate.

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“…Researchers should take the latter possibility seriously and not preclude it by presenting their respondents with restrictive questionnaires. Ideally, to acquire a balanced view of folk opinion, survey-based studies should be complemented with methods of dialogue and reflection [17].…”

Section: Researching 'Folk Speciesism': Six Caveatsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Speciesism Debate: Intuition, Method, and Empirical Advances

Hopster

2019

Animals

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Simple Summary: An influential idea in animal ethics is that moral favouritism towards members of one's own species is a prejudice. This prejudice has been labelled 'speciesism', in analogy with racism and sexism. But not all ethicists subscribe to the view that speciesism is a prejudice. In fact, the tenability of speciesism is a topic of ongoing ethical debate. A recent exchange between Peter Singer and Shelly Kagan might leave the impression that this debate has essentially reached a stalemate, since the disputing parties rely on irreconcilable moral intuitions. In the present article, I argue that this impression is misleading. I highlight both philosophical and empirical research avenues that can help to move the speciesism debate forward, emphasizing that not all ethical intuitions about speciesism should be given equal weight. The article is part of the special issue 'Animal Ethics: Questioning the Orthodoxy'.Abstract: This article identifies empirical, conceptual and normative avenues to advance the speciesism debate. First, I highlight the application of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) as one such avenue: especially where (anti-)speciesist positions heavily rely on appeals to moral intuition, and EDAs have potential to move the debate forward. Second, an avenue for conceptual progress is the delineation of speciesism from other views in its vicinity, specifically from the view that biological differences between species are sometimes morally relevant ('species-relativism'). Third, if we adopt Singer's definition of speciesism, then a limitation of the current debate is that it is not obvious whether the core ethical principle that underlies anti-speciesist positions-the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests-is widely applicable. Arguably, the interests of animals are often too dissimilar to establish what equal consideration amounts to. I underscore the need for integrating philosophical and empirical research, to come to terms with the extent to which the interests of members of different species are alike, and with the question of whether any dissimilarities might be morally relevant."Our inclination to treat humans as though we are special is no mere prejudice. Despite what Singer says, there is a significant philosophical view at work here-one worthy of careful further investigation." Shelly Kagan [1] (p. 20)"At the end of the day, no clear consensus has emerged-or, at best, this one: no rejoinder to Singer's attack on speciesism has convinced many besides its author, and the challenge remains." François Jaquet [2] (p. 2)

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Intuitions, reflective judgments, and experimental philosophy

Cited by 21 publications

References 57 publications

Recent experimental work on “ought” implies “can”

Recent experimental work on “ought” implies “can”

An empirical argument against moral non-cognitivism

The Speciesism Debate: Intuition, Method, and Empirical Advances

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