Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge

Horvath, Joachim; Wiegmann, Alex

doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0627-1

Cited by 69 publications

(46 citation statements)

References 103 publications

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“…On the other hand, however, the need to exclude a substantial number of participants (in some cases, over half) should be avoided as much as possible, to prevent concerns about researcherdegrees-of-freedom (Simmons et al 2011) and statistical artefacts (Shanks 2017) as alternative explanations for reported findings. Several of the studies we surveyed excluded a large number of participants for failing basic comprehension tests or otherwise showing that they did not follow task requirements: For example, Wilkenfeld et al (2016) tested 142 participants but also mention that a further 188 participants were excluded for failing to consent, failing to complete the experiment, or giving an incorrect response to one of the reading or comprehension questions; Horvath and Wiegmann (2016) excluded the data of 142 (out of 284) subjects who did not complete the survey or completed it in under 1 min; Berniūnas and Dranseika (2016) excluded 52 of 300 participants for failing a comprehension task; and Roberts et al (2016) tested 140 participants but excluded 72 of them-65 for answering one or more comprehension questions incorrectly, and 7 because they had formal training in philosophy. When a large proportion of participants fails comprehension tests, this implies that the task design may have benefitted from additional piloting, prior to running the study, in order to make its content sufficiently clear to participants; and restrictions that disqualify from participation and can be known in advance (such as having formal training in philosophy) should be applied during initial participant screening rather than after data collection.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reporting in Experimental Philosophy: Current Standards and Recommendations for Future Practice

et al. 2018

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Recent replication crises in psychology and other fields have led to intense reflection about the validity of common research practices. Much of this reflection has focussed on reporting standards, and how they may be related to the questionable research practices that could underlie a high proportion of irreproducible findings in the published record. As a developing field, it is particularly important for Experimental Philosophy to avoid some of the pitfalls that have beset other disciplines. To this end, here we provide a detailed, comprehensive assessment of current reporting practices in Experimental Philosophy. We focus on the quality of statistical reporting and the disclosure of information about study methodology. We assess all the articles using quantitative methods (n = 134) that were published over the years 2013-2016 in 29 leading philosophy journals. We find that null hypothesis significance testing is the prevalent statistical practice in Experimental Philosophy, although relying solely on this approach has been criticised in the psychological literature. To augment this approach, various additional measures have become commonplace in other fields, but we find that Experimental Philosophy has adopted these only partially: 53% of the papers report an effect size, 28% confidence intervals, 1% examined prospective statistical power and 5% report observed statistical power. Importantly, we find no direct relation between an article's reporting quality and its impact (numbers of citations). We conclude with recommendations for authors, reviewers and editors in Experimental Philosophy, to facilitate making research statistically-transparent and reproducible.Rev.Phil.Psych.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reporting in Experimental Philosophy: Current Standards and Recommendations for Future Practice

et al. 2018

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“…3 This may help to forestall worries about testing expert ethicists with all-too-familiar cases, which may not fully engage their intuitive expertise (cf. Horvath & Wiegmann, 2016;Rini, 2015).…”

Section: )mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is no wonder, then, that other philosophers have forcefully responded to the experimental restrictionist challenge in various ways (see, e.g., Horvath, 2010;Kauppinen, 2007;Ludwig, 2007;Nagel, 2012;Sosa, 2007Sosa, , 2009). An especially interesting and muchdiscussed response is the so-called expertise defense (for recent surveys, see Horvath & Wiegmann, 2016;Nado, 2014). The basic idea is that professional philosophers are experts concerning the intuitive evaluation of thought experiment cases.…”

Section: Intuitive Expertise and The Expertise Defensementioning

confidence: 99%

“…A problem with indirect strategies of this kind is that paradigm cases of intuitive expertise in psychology, such as fire ground commanders (Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986), or nurses in neonatal intensive care units (Crandall & Getchell-Reiter, 1993), are strikingly disanalogous to thoughtexperimenting philosophers (cf. Horvath & Wiegmann, 2016). So, at the present stage of the debate, direct strategies for assessing the expertise defense seem more promising, that is, strategies that rely on experimental studies with professional philosophers.…”

Section: Intuitive Expertise and The Expertise Defensementioning

confidence: 99%

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Intuitive Expertise and Irrelevant Options

Wiegmann¹,

Horvath²,

Meyer³

2018

Preprint

Self Cite

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In the so-called push dilemma, an out-of-control speed-train is about to run over five people and can only be stopped by pushing a heavy person onto the tracks. Most lay people and moral philosophers consider it morally wrong to kill the heavy person. Unger (1992, 1996), however, argued that adding irrelevant options to the push dilemma would overturn this intuition. In this paper, we empirically test Unger's claim with both lay people and expert moral philosophers. Including philosophical experts allowed us to investigate the so-called expertise defense, according to which the intuitions of philosophical experts are superior to the intuitions of lay people. Overall, we found that adding irrelevant options indeed increased the ratings for the "push option". Moreover, we found that the intuitions of expert moral philosophers were no less susceptible to the presence of irrelevant options than lay people's intuitions. We discuss how these findings bear on the expertise defense.

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“…A debate has emerged on the nature of philosophical expertise; whether professional philosophers possess a special kind of expertise, what this expertise entails, whether expertise is at all possible in philosophy, whether it could be experimentally tested, and similar concerns (Weinberg et al ; Nado ; Machery ; Mizrahi ; Rini ; Horvath and Wiegmann ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophical Expertise and Philosophical Methodology

Seyedsayamdost

2019

Metaphilosophy

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In recent years a new discussion on the nature of philosophical expertise has emerged: whether philosophers possess a special kind of expertise, what such expertise would entail, how to measure it, and related concerns. The aim of the present article is to clarify certain related points across these debates in the hope of paving a clearer path forward, by addressing the following. (1) The expertise defense, which seems central to many discussions on methodology and expertise, has been misconstrued at times. (2) Questions of expertise and methodology could be separated more clearly. (3) The study of expertise may be important in its own right; however, there may be good reasons to give priority to methodological concerns. (4) Finally, when viewed in light of methodological concerns, a new project emerges when engaging with recent contributions to the expertise debate. The present article attempts a brief outline of this project.

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Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge

Cited by 69 publications

References 103 publications

Reporting in Experimental Philosophy: Current Standards and Recommendations for Future Practice

Reporting in Experimental Philosophy: Current Standards and Recommendations for Future Practice

Intuitive Expertise and Irrelevant Options

Philosophical Expertise and Philosophical Methodology

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