Intuitive Non‐naturalism Meets Cosmic Coincidence

Bedke, Matthew S.

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01336.x

Cited by 57 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Enoch () is in agreement with Bedke (2009a) that this is the nature of the putative epistemological problem for realism.…”

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confidence: 81%

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Meta‐normative Realism, Evolution, and Our Reasons to Survive

Behrends

2013

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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In this article, I articulate and respond to an epistemological challenge to meta‐normative realism. The challenge has it that, if realism about the normative is correct, and if evolutionary forces have significantly influenced our normative judgments, then it would be a remarkable coincidence if the content of the normative facts and our normative judgments were aligned. I criticize David Enoch's recent attempt to meet this challenge, but provide an alternative response that is structurally similar. I argue that if realism is correct, then it would be remarkable if the content of our normative judgments and the normative facts were not significantly aligned.

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“…Enoch () is in agreement with Bedke (2009a) that this is the nature of the putative epistemological problem for realism.…”

supporting

confidence: 81%

“…Bedke (2009a) is especially clear about treating genealogical critiques as designed to undercut justification or warrant.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Meta‐normative Realism, Evolution, and Our Reasons to Survive

Behrends

2013

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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“…2 Debunking arguments-and associated Breliability challenges^-arise in various philosophical domains, targeting beliefs about morality, the existence of God, logic, math and others. For example, see Clarke-Doane (2012),Bedke (2009), Street (2006,Joyce (2000Joyce ( , 2006, and Harman(1977)on ethics; Mason (2010), Rea (2002), and Plantinga (1994) on religion; Schechter (2010, 2013) on logic; and Clarke-Doane (2012), Field (1989: 25-30), and Benacerraf (1973) on math. See White(2010)for a general discussion of the epistemology of debunking.…”

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confidence: 97%

Debunking Rationalist Defenses of Common-Sense Ontology: An Empirical Approach

Osborne

2015

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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Debunking arguments typically attempt to show that a set of beliefs or other intensional mental states (e.g., intuitions) bear no appropriate explanatory connection to the facts they purport to be about. That is, a debunking argument will attempt to show that beliefs about p are not held because of the facts about p. Such beliefs, if true, would then only be accidentally so. Thus, their causal origins constitute an undermining defeater. Debunking arguments arise in various philosophical domains, targeting beliefs about morality, the existence of God, logic, and others. They have also arisen in material-object metaphysics, often aimed at debunking common-sense ontology. And while most of these arguments feature appeals to 'biological and cultural contingencies' that are ostensibly responsible for our beliefs about which kinds of objects exist, few (if any) of them take a serious look at what those contingencies might actually be. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to remedy this by providing empirical substantiation for a key premise in these debunking arguments by examining data from cognitive science, evolutionary biology, and developmental psychology that support a 'debunking explanation' of our common-sense beliefs and intuitions about which objects exist. Second, to argue that such data also undermines a particular kind of rationalist defense of common-sense ontology, sometimes employed as a response to the debunking threat.

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“…After all, if moral facts were natural facts, why couldn't we come to know them the way we come to know other natural facts? But if moral facts are non-natural and thus causally inefficacious, while intuitions are psychological states with causal histories governed by natural laws, it would have to be a fantastic cosmic coincidence for the contents of the intuitions to align with the non-natural facts (Bedke 2009). Further, mere adequate understanding of the content is supposed to justify belief in the self-evident proposition.…”

Section: Non-moral Examples Of Putatively Self-evident Propositions Imentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Intuition in Philosophy and Psychology

Kauppinen

2014

Handbook of Neuroethics

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Almost everyone agrees that ethical disputes cannot be resolved by appealing to empirical evidence alone. How, then, can we settle which moral principles to adopt or what to think of a particular moral issue? It is not uncommon for philosophers to appeal to intuitions as fundamental evidence or source of evidence. Is this practice justifiable, particularly in the light of recent findings in psychology and neuroscience?To begin with, we have to know what we are talking about. The term 'intuition' has many related uses in philosophy and psychology. Generally speaking, intuition contrasts with reasoning, and has connotations with spontaneity and insight. But closer examination reveals that there are a number of different phenomena in this area, with the result that we must take great care to avoid talking past one another. My goal in this chapter is to clarify these distinctions and relate different conceptions in different disciplines to each other, in the hope of understanding better when and why we may rely on intuitions in ethical inquiry.The most obvious distinction is between intuition as a kind of psychological faculty and intuition as a psychological state. In the first sense, intuition contrasts with reason and vision, for example. It is something we can make use of when forming beliefs. Some Early Modern Rationalists may have believed that we have such a special capacity to gain immediate access to abstract truths. But few if any contemporary philosophers believe in any such faculty, so this sense can safely be left aside here.

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Intuitive Non‐naturalism Meets Cosmic Coincidence

Cited by 57 publications

References 15 publications

Meta‐normative Realism, Evolution, and Our Reasons to Survive

Meta‐normative Realism, Evolution, and Our Reasons to Survive

Debunking Rationalist Defenses of Common-Sense Ontology: An Empirical Approach

Moral Intuition in Philosophy and Psychology

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