Having no recourse to ways of knowing about the natural world, ethical non-naturalists are in need of an epistemology that might apply to a normative breed of facts or properties, and intuitionism seems well suited to fill that bill. Here I argue that the metaphysical inspiration for ethical intuitionism undermines that very epistemology, for this pair of views generates what I call the defeater from cosmic coincidence. Unfortunately, we face not a happy union, but a difficult choice: either ethical intuitionism or ethical nonnaturalism, but not both.p apq_1336 188..209Ethical intuitionism is the view that certain cognitions 1 non-inferentially and prima facie justify corresponding ethical beliefs. The view has lately enjoyed a period of revitalizing defenses, which clarify the commitments of the view, and distinguish it from its associates. Though ethical nonnaturalism -the metaphysical view that moral facts or properties are suitably mind-independent, but not reducible to the natural world -and generalism -the view that the object of basic ethical knowledge is of general principles, not particulars 2 -are commonly paired with an intuitionist epistemology, they are, strictly speaking, independent commitments. Whatever legitimate complaints there might be about nonnaturalism or generalism, the epistemic view should not suffer the sins of its associates. 3 That said, the marriage of ethical intuitionism and ethical nonnaturalism is particularly well motivated. 4 Having no recourse to ways of knowing about the natural world, non-naturalists are in need of an epistemology that might apply to a normative breed of facts or pro-

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Here I discuss the conceptual structure and core semantic commitments of reason thought and discourse needed to underwrite the claim that ethical normativity is not uniquely queer. This deflates a primary source of ethical scepticism and it vindicates so-called partner in crime arguments. When it comes to queerness objections, all reason-implicating normative claimsincluding those concerning Humean reasons to pursue one's ends, and epistemic reasons to form true beliefs-stand or fall together. Might All Normativity Be Queer?

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Consider orthodox motivational judgment internalism: necessarily, A's sincere moral judgment that he or she ought to u motivates A to u. Such principles fail because they cannot accommodate the amoralist, or one who renders moral judgments without any corresponding motivation. The orthodox alternative, externalism, posits only contingent relations between moral judgment and motivation. In response I first revive conceptual internalism by offering some modifications on the amoralist case to show that certain community-wide motivational failures are not conceptually possible. Second, I introduce a theory of moral motivation that supplements the intuitive responses to different amoralist cases. According to moral judgment purposivism (MJP), in rough approximation, a purpose of moral judgments is to motivate corresponding behaviors such that a mental state without this purpose is not a moral judgment. MJP is consistent with conceptual desiderata, provides an illuminating analysis of amoralist cases, and offers a step forward in the internalist-externalist debates.