Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency*

Deery, Oisín; Bedke, Matthew S.; Nichols, Shaun

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.003.0006

Cited by 36 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…On a causal-historical approach, eliminativism likewise follows if we assume, as Nichols does, that the phenomenology of free will is illusory. Nichols has elsewhere argued, as have I, that our phenomenology is libertarian and incompatibilist in nature (see Deery et al 2013;Caruso 2012). But on the assumption that we lack libertarian free will, one of the key assumptions of Nichols's argument, it turns out that our first-person experience of free will is illusory as well.…”

Section: Both Paths Lead To Eliminativismmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…Yet, on a causal-historical account of reference, despite Nichols's claims to the contrary, eliminativism also seems to follow since it is prima facie plausible to think that the concept of ''free will'' was originally baptized in a causal-historical story which appealed, at least in part, to our first-person experience of free agency. And since Nichols and I have both argued elsewhere that the phenomenology of free agency is best viewed in a libertarian and incompatibilist sense (see Caruso 2012;Deery et al 2013), one that is likely in error, eliminativism awaits us down this path too.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Free will eliminativism: reference, error, and phenomenology

Caruso

2015

Philos Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Shaun Nichols has recently argued that while the folk notion of free will is associated with error, a question still remains whether the concept of free will should be eliminated or preserved. He maintains that like other eliminativist arguments in philosophy, arguments that free will is an illusion seem to depend on substantive assumptions about reference. According to free will eliminativists, people have deeply mistaken beliefs about free will and this entails that free will does not exist. However, an alternative reaction is that free will does exist, we just have some deeply mistaken beliefs about it. According to Nichols, all such debates boil down to whether or not the erroneous folk term in question successfully refers or not. Since Nichols adopts the view that reference is systematically ambiguous, he maintains that in some contexts it's appropriate to take a restrictivist view about whether a term embedded in a false theory refers, while in other contexts it's appropriate to take a liberal view about whether a token of the very same term refers. This, according to Nichols, affords the possibility of saying that the sentence ''free will exists'' is false in some contexts and true in others. In this paper I argue that even if we grant Nichols his pluralistic approach to reference, there is still good reason to prefer eliminativism to preservationism with regard to free will. My argument focuses on one important difference between the concept of ''free will'' and other theoretical terms embedded in false theories-i.e., the role that the phenomenology of free agency plays in reference fixing.Keywords Free will Á Eliminativism Á Reference Á Phenomenology Shaun Nichols (2013) has recently argued that while the folk notion of free will is associated with error, a question still remains whether the concept of free will should be eliminated or preserved. He maintains that like other eliminativist arguments in

show abstract

Section: Both Paths Lead To Eliminativismmentioning

confidence: 90%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Free will eliminativism: reference, error, and phenomenology

Caruso

2015

Philos Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…While early studies by Nahmias et al (2004) deny the libertarian hypothesis, more comprehensive studies conducted by Deery et al (2013) indicate that the hypothesis may in fact be right. In these experiments, participants were asked to decide between two options (for instance, two charities) and were asked whether, as they faced their decision, they experienced being free to choose either option.…”

Section: Do Indeterminist Beliefs Have Their Source In Experience?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When the agent tries to hold in mind both models of her decision at the same timesay, in a forced choice experiment in which she is asked whether her experience is consistent with determinism (cf. Deery et al 2013)-each model will be felt to be inconsistent with the other.…”

Section: Indeterminist Experience and Beliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why people believe in indeterminist free will

Deery

2014

Philos Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Recent empirical evidence indicates that (1) people tend to believe that they possess indeterminist free will, and (2) people's experience of choosing and deciding is that they possess such freedom. Some also maintain that (3) people's belief in indeterminist free will has its source in their experience of choosing and deciding. Yet there seem to be good reasons to resist endorsing (3). Despite this, I maintain that belief in indeterminist free will really does have its source in experience. I explain how this is so by appeal to the phenomenon of prospection, which is the mental simulation of future possibilities for the purpose of guiding action. Crucially, prospection can be experienced. And because of the way in which prospection models choice, it is easy for agents to experience and to believe that their choice is indeterministic. Yet this belief is not justified; the experience of prospection, and hence of free will as being indeterminist, is actually consistent with determinism.

show abstract

“…Dialectically, this is more helpful than simply banging one's fist on the table and insisting that the experience is compatibilist. Even so, it commits compatibilists to arguing that the experience is exhaustively compatibilist, and it is not clear whether compatibilists need to shoulder this burden, especially since there is evidence that ordinary people (as well as philosophers) tend to judge their experiences of freedom as inconsistent with determinism [Deery et al 2013]. 11 It would be helpful if compatibilists could avoid having to deny the introspective claims of those reporting libertarian phenomenology.…”

Section: Compatibilist Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Fall From Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn't Justified By Experience

Deery

2014

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency*

Cited by 36 publications

References 21 publications

Free will eliminativism: reference, error, and phenomenology

Free will eliminativism: reference, error, and phenomenology

Why people believe in indeterminist free will

The Fall From Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn't Justified By Experience

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About