Invasive PUF Analysis

Nedospasov, Dmitry; Seifert, Jean-Pierre; Helfmeier, Clemens; Boit, Christian

doi:10.1109/fdtc.2013.19

Cited by 111 publications

(64 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Furthermore, it is assumed that PUFs are tamper-evident and any invasive attempt to characterize the PUF or probe the PUF responses destroys the PUF, which leads to the loss of the secret. The latter assumption is proved to be invalid since a set of attacks in the literature has been reported, which could break the security of a set of PUF architecture by semi-invasive and fully-invasive attacks [54,34,64].…”

Section: Problem Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Physical Security of Physically Unclonable Functions

Tajik

2019

T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services

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Section: Problem Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Physical Security of Physically Unclonable Functions

Tajik

2019

T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services

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“…As for SRAM PUFs, they are susceptible to extreme operating conditions [52] and physical tampering [53]. As a result, the SRAM PUF hardware can be physically inspected and modified [54]. Furthermore, it was established by Helfmeier et al [53] that upon gaining the response of an SRAM PUF, C 1 , a focus ion 132 | P a g e www.ijacsa.thesai.org beam (FIB) can be utilized to alter the circuits of SRAM PUF, C 2 so that C 2 will have a very similar challenge/response behavior as C 1 .…”

Section: ) Attacks On Weak Pufsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Defense Mechanisms against Machine Learning Modeling Attacks on Strong Physical Unclonable Functions for IOT Authentication: A Review

Noor¹,

Daud²,

Ahmad³

et al. 2017

ijacsa

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Abstract-Security component in IoT system are very crucial because the devices within the IoT system are exposed to numerous malicious attacks. Typical security components in IoT system performs authentication, authorization, message and content integrity check. Regarding authentication, it is normally performed using classical authentication scheme using crypto module. However, the utilization of the crypto module in IoT authentication is not feasible because of the distributed nature of the IoT system which complicates the message cipher and decipher process. Thus, the Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is suggested to replace crypto module for IoT authentication because it only utilizes responses from set of challenges instead of cryptographic keys to authenticate devices. PUF can generate large number of challenge-response pairs (CRPs) which is good for authentication because the unpredictability is high. However, with the emergence of machine learning modeling, the CRPs now can be predicted through machine learning algorithms. Various defense mechanisms were proposed to counter machine learning modeling attacks (ML-MA). Although they were experimentally proven to be able to increase resiliency against ML-MA, they caused the generated responses to be instable and incurred high area overhead. Thus, there is a need to design the best defense mechanism which is not only resistant to ML-MA but also produces reliable responses and reduces area overhead. This paper presents an analysis on defense mechanisms against ML-MA on strong PUFs for IoT authentication.

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“…side channel [6,28,34], invasive [27,29], and fault injection attacks [7,37]. To our knowledge there is no known strong PUF design that is secure against physical attacks without classical hardware security measures that are also applied to secure flash memory.…”

Section: Resilience Against Physical Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Attackers Lose: Design and Security Analysis of Arbitrarily Large XOR Arbiter PUFs

Wisiol

Graebnitz²,

Margraf

et al.

EPiC Series in Computing

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In a novel analysis, we formally prove that arbitrarily many Arbiter PUFs can be combined into a stable XOR Arbiter PUF. To the best of our knowledge, this design cannot be modeled by any known oracle access attack in polynomial time.Using majority vote of arbiter chain responses, our analysis shows that with a polynomial number of votes, the XOR Arbiter PUF stability of almost all challenges can be boosted exponentially close to 1; that is, the stability gain through majority voting can exceed the stability loss introduced by large XORs for a feasible number of votes. Considering state-of-the-art modeling attacks by Becker and Rührmair et al., our proposal enables the designer to increase the attacker's effort exponentially while still maintaining polynomial design effort. This is the first result that relates PUF design to this traditional cryptographic design principle.

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Invasive PUF Analysis

Cited by 111 publications

References 19 publications

On the Physical Security of Physically Unclonable Functions

On the Physical Security of Physically Unclonable Functions

Defense Mechanisms against Machine Learning Modeling Attacks on Strong Physical Unclonable Functions for IOT Authentication: A Review

Why Attackers Lose: Design and Security Analysis of Arbitrarily Large XOR Arbiter PUFs

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