Investment in Cleaner Technologies in a Transboundary Pollution Dynamic Game: A Numerical Investigation

Frutos, Javier de; Gatón, Víctor; López-Pérez, Paula M.; Martín‐Herrán, Guiomar

doi:10.1007/s13235-022-00445-z

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…WP risk sources are factors that may lead to WP incidents, including people, objects and events with hazardous and uncertain characteristics [8]. Risk sources can be divided into two categories in terms of source, namely man-made risk sources and natural risk sources.…”

Section: Risk Sources Of Sudden Wp Accidentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Early Warning Model of Sudden Water Pollution Based on the Latent Factor

2023

WPPCP

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At present, the treatment process for sudden water pollution(WP) problems generally includes water quality exceeding warning, artificial investigation of warning reasons, artificial search for pollution source(PS), risk assessment by experts, and formulation and implementation of emergency plans. However, sudden WP events usually cause huge harm in a short time, and emergency measures often fail to respond in a timely manner. Therefore, in order to give early warning and quickly deal with sudden pollution, this paper constructs a recurrent WP early warning model(EWM). By comparing the prediction and simulation of total phosphorus concentration in water body by the latent factor model and Mike model, it is found that the prediction value based on the LFM is very consistent with the simulation value, It can be used to predict the distribution characteristics of water pollutants from PS and help people deal with WP incidents quickly.

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Section: Risk Sources Of Sudden Wp Accidentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Early Warning Model of Sudden Water Pollution Based on the Latent Factor

2023

WPPCP

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“…Zeng et al proposed a hybrid game theory and mathematical planning model (HGT-MPM) to solve the transboundary water pollution problem in two cities in northern China by reasonably allocating the water rights and pollutant discharge rights of the two cities [14]. De Frutos et al investigated the strategic effects of regional investments in adopting clean technologies and examined the feedback equilibrium of a dynamic game of non-cooperative transboundary pollution between two regions in an infinite range [15]. Evolutionary game theory was used by Yuan et al to examine stakeholders' tactical decision-making involving conflicts of interests around water pollution [16].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Third-Party Governance of Groundwater Ammonia Nitrogen Pollution: An Evolutionary Game Analysis Considering Reward and Punishment Distribution Mechanism and Pollution Rights Trading Policy

Sun,

Liu

2023

Sustainability

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With the acceleration of Chinese industrialization, industrial wastewater is discharged in large quantities, leading to a groundwater environment with high ammonia nitrogen characteristics in many places, which seriously endangers people’s health and makes the treatment of ammonia nitrogen by enterprises an urgent issue. Therefore, based on the principle of “no-fault responsibility”, this paper combines China’s pollution trading rights policy and the reward and punishment distribution mechanism to provide a three-party governance model for groundwater ammonia nitrogen treatment under the benefit sharing of emissions trading. By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model of groundwater ammonia nitrogen pollution treatment among sewage discharge enterprises, third-party governance enterprises and local governments, the role mechanisms of the strategic choices of different participating actors are analyzed. Finally, the validity of the model is verified via simulation, and the influence of key variables on the evolutionary stability of the system and the strategic choices of the participating parties under different situations are discussed. The research results show that setting reasonable reward and punishment allocation coefficients is the basis for promoting active pollution treatment among sewage discharge enterprises and third-party governance enterprises; a change in pollution rights trading revenue is a key factor affecting the strategic choices of the three parties; sewage discharge enterprises show stronger revenue sensitivity than third-party governance enterprises; and an environmental treatment credit system built by the government can effectively enhance the enthusiasm of enterprises to control pollution. Based on the research results of this paper, the participation of third-party governance enterprises in pollution rights trading is explored, which effectively promotes enterprises to actively carry out groundwater ammonia nitrogen treatment and provides a reference for the government to improve the construction of a sustainable development system for the water environment.

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“…Li and Guo [40] developed a dynamic decision model of transboundary basin pollution with emission permits trading and pollution abatement investment. De Frutos et al [41] used a differential game model to compare the equilibrium trajectories of the stocks of pollution and cleaner technology as well the regions' welfare. De Frutos and Martín-Herrán [42] analyzed a transboundary pollution differential game and introduced a spatial dimension to capture the geographical relationships among regions.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The output and abatement level of each firm depend on the allowable emissions in two regions; ∂q iS θ i , θ j /∂θ i > 0, ∂q jS θ i , θ j /∂θ i < 0, which means that when the emission standard level in region i is more restrictive (i.e., a decrease in θ i ), the output of firm in region i will decrease correspondingly, while the output of the firm in region j will increase. This phenomenon is called the "rent-shifting" effect [41,50], i.e., local strict environmental policies will reduce the output of the local firm, but will simultaneously increase the output of the firm in the neighboring region. From the reaction function of the pollution abatement level of the firm in region i, ∂r iS θ i , θ j /∂θ i < 0, ∂r jS θ i , θ j /∂θ i < 0, and the net emissions ∂E iS θ i , θ j /∂θ i > 0 and ∂E jS θ i , θ j /∂θ i = 0 can be obtained.…”

Section: Emission Standards (Scenario S)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Environmental Policy in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game: Emission Standards, Taxes, and Permit Trading

Luo

2022

Sustainability

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Global environmental problems such as transboundary pollution and global warming have been recognized as major issues around the world. In practice, governments of all countries are actively exploring various environmental policies to control pollution. The government needs to consider the impact of neighboring regions when formulating environmental policies, especially in the context of transboundary pollution. However, the above problems are less studied, to bridge this gap and aim at solving problems in existing practices, we consider a differential game model of transboundary pollution control to examine which policy is more effective in promoting environmental quality and social welfare in a dynamic and accumulative global pollution context. Three alternative policy instruments, namely emission standards, emission taxes, and emission permit trading, are considered and compared. The results show that the social welfare of each region is the lowest and the total pollution stock is the highest under the emission tax policy due to the “rent-shifting,” “policy-leakage,” and “free-riding” effects. Moreover, the realized level of the environmental policy in the Nash equilibrium of the policy game is distorted away from the socially optimal level. The emission standards policy is found to be better than the emission tax policy and characterized by initiating the rent-shifting effect without the policy-leakage effect. Moreover, the pollution stock of two regions is found to be the lowest and the social welfare is found to be the highest under the emission permit trading policy, which is not associated with any of the three effects. Finally, a numerical example is used to illustrate the results, and a sensitivity analysis is performed in the steady state.

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Investment in Cleaner Technologies in a Transboundary Pollution Dynamic Game: A Numerical Investigation

Cited by 4 publications

References 24 publications

The Early Warning Model of Sudden Water Pollution Based on the Latent Factor

The Early Warning Model of Sudden Water Pollution Based on the Latent Factor

Third-Party Governance of Groundwater Ammonia Nitrogen Pollution: An Evolutionary Game Analysis Considering Reward and Punishment Distribution Mechanism and Pollution Rights Trading Policy

Optimal Environmental Policy in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game: Emission Standards, Taxes, and Permit Trading

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