Investment in cleaner technology and signaling distortions in a market with green consumers

Sengupta, Aditi

doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2012.04.001

Cited by 42 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Sengupta (2012Sengupta ( , 2015, building on earlier work in the industrial organization literature (Bagwell and Riordan, 1991;Reinganum, 2007, 2008;Janssen and Roy, 2010), shows that firms may be able to signal their environmental quality through their prices if consumers (i) have sufficient information about firm costs and market demand conditions, and (ii) form particular beliefs if they observe nonequilibrium prices. The information and out-of-equilibrium beliefs are required to reduce the multiplicity of equilibria common in signaling games (Cho and Kreps, 1987).…”

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confidence: 91%

Green, greener, greenest: Eco-label gradation and competition

Veld

2015

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

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confidence: 91%

Green, greener, greenest: Eco-label gradation and competition

Veld

2015

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

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“…In the existing economics literature, the research studies which would be very close in aim and scope to that of the present research, are those investigating game theoretic analysis of environmental tax effect on the firms' green investment. These may include Requate [11], Song and Leng [12], Sengupta [13], Krass et al [14], Gsottbauer and van den Bergh [15] and Gao and Zheng [16]. Requate [11] considered a basic analysis model in an output market with imperfect competition, assuming that a single firm operates in this market and produces industry-specific pollutants (or local pollutants).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tax Policy, Environmental Concern and Level of Emission Reduction

et al. 2019

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Regulators often use environmental policy to induce green initiatives by firms. This paper examines the emission-reduction-inducement effect of the environmental tax deduction (ETD) incentive by Stackelberg game models between an environmental regulator and a profit-maximizing monopolistic firm facing emission-dependent demand. Different cases, i.e., with/without considering the regulator’s environmental concerns, were used to investigate the ETD policy effects with a numerical example. This paper shows that the regulator’s tax policy will only affect the emission reduction level, but cannot influence the output, which combined with the firm’s operation factors mainly depends the consumers’ attitude toward green products and price sensitivity. Numerical simulation results showed that for the cases with a moderate level of environmental concern and emission standard, the regulator can set an ETD incentive to motivate the choice of a higher level of emission reduction and simultaneously increase social welfare; otherwise, the increase in environmental quality is at the expense of social welfare. When the market’s environmental consciousness increases, it is easier for the regulator to guide the firm to adopt an ETD solution. Therefore, improving consumers’ awareness of environmental protection is an effective way to promote green investment of firms.

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“…Their results show that feedback equilibrium is beneficial to the manufacturer, while is harmful to the retailer. Furthermore, studies on environmental consciousness can be found in Sengupta [31], Espínola-Arredondo and Muñoz-García [32] and Heijinen [33].…”

Section: Rq1mentioning

confidence: 99%

Low Carbon Strategy Analysis of Competing Supply Chains with Different Power Structures

Liu

Tsai

2017

Sustainability

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This paper investigates the emission reduction performance for supply chain members in both single-channel and exclusive dual-channel cases. Two game scenarios (Manufacturer Stackelberg and Retailer Stackelberg) are examined under different channel structures. Furthermore, we introduce government subsidies as an impact factor of low-carbon strategy adoption. In the single-channel (Case 1), we mainly examine the influence of consumers' price-sensitivity on channel members' optimal decisions. In the dual-channel (Case 2), we focus on the joint impact of product substitutability and different channel power structures on the optimal decisions under asymmetric related channel status. The analysis suggests that the Stackelberg leaders always perform better than their corresponding followers before emission reduction, while they may not necessarily yield more benefits after emission reduction. The implementation of low-carbon strategy depends on parameters like product substitutability and channel base demand. Finally, all the supply chain members will encounter a Prisoner's Dilemma when the product substitutability is relatively high.

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Investment in cleaner technology and signaling distortions in a market with green consumers

Cited by 42 publications

References 20 publications

Green, greener, greenest: Eco-label gradation and competition

Green, greener, greenest: Eco-label gradation and competition

Tax Policy, Environmental Concern and Level of Emission Reduction

Low Carbon Strategy Analysis of Competing Supply Chains with Different Power Structures

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