2010
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.08.010
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Investment incentives and corporate tax asymmetries

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Cited by 172 publications
(123 citation statements)
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“…In the following section we provide an overview of previous literature dealing with the effects of tax loss treatment and derive empirically study of Edgerton (2009) shows that in the US, existing loss carryforwards limit the benefits of a newly granted bonus depreciation.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the following section we provide an overview of previous literature dealing with the effects of tax loss treatment and derive empirically study of Edgerton (2009) shows that in the US, existing loss carryforwards limit the benefits of a newly granted bonus depreciation.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…114-118, on German and Austrian corporations. The increasing relevance of loss-making companies in comparison to profitable corporations in the U.S. is addressed in the studies by, e.g., Altshuler et al (2009) and Edgerton (2010), p. 936 f. 5 On the impact of tax regulations on investment incentives see, e.g., already Lintner (1954), Brown (1962), and Sandmo (1974). 6 Gutiérrez et al (2011) provide an overview of loss compensation rules in industrialized nations.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The higher effect for loss carrybacks reflects that these rules provide 2 For the period 1993-2004, 45-52 percent of U.S. corporations reported total net operating losses valued at over $2.9 trillion (Cooper and Knittel, 2010). In 2002 alone, U.S. firms reported over $418 billion in losses on their tax returns, equivalent to more than 50 percent of the $676 billion of income reported by profitable firms (Edgerton, 2010). 3 Domar and Musgrave (1944) first explored the second effect in a model of individual portfolio choice.…”
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confidence: 99%
“…For example, Devereux, Keen, and Schiantarelli (1994) find that tax asymmetries do not improve the performance of tax-adjusted Q equations in predicting the level of investment. Edgerton (2010) studies how the asymmetric tax treatment of profits and losses affects the size of firm investment. He finds that such asymmetries made bonus depreciation tax incentives at most four percent less effective than if all firms had been taxable.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%