Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan; Zweiri, Mahjoob

doi:10.5040/9780755609932

Cited by 97 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…However, by 2005, many felt betrayed because of Khatami’s perceived failure to reform the Islamic Republic. This contributed to Ahmadinejad’s electoral victory through reformists boycotting elections (Ehteshami and Zweiri, 2007: 58). Furthermore, a different social base supported Ahmadinejad.…”

Section: The Discursive Construction Of Israel and Global Order Throumentioning

confidence: 99%

Populism, the International and Methodological Nationalism: Global Order and the Iran–Israel Nexus

Holliday

2019

Political Studies

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This article contends that the international is integral to populism. Thus, it calls for populism scholarship to embrace the interconnectivity between the domestic/internal and international/external. By borrowing from Global Historical Sociology, Global International Relations and Ernesto Laclau’s notion of populist discourse, the article puts forward a new conceptual framework for the study of populism that bridges the gap between Comparative Politics and International Relations. It shows how populist discourse simultaneously constructs several aspects of the social world: the actor who is articulating it and its relationship with its own population, that actor’s relationship with others in the international system, and global order. To illustrate its case, it examines populist discourses of Islamic Republic of Iran elites. Their discourses articulate the need to maintain the Islamic Republic’s legitimacy and populist credentials inside and outside Iran, delegitimise Israel, and construct global order. These discourses are grounded in a historical trajectory: the 1979 Revolution.

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Section: The Discursive Construction Of Israel and Global Order Throumentioning

confidence: 99%

Populism, the International and Methodological Nationalism: Global Order and the Iran–Israel Nexus

Holliday

2019

Political Studies

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“…Some leaders such as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Rafsanjani are actively involved in foreign policy, while others such as Ayatollah Khomeini were more inclined to delegate authority to others in their decision-making. A group of decision-makers such as Khatami believed in consensus and collaborative decisions making, whereas Ahmadinejad was reluctant to accept such a collaborative process (Ehteshami and Zweiri, 2011: 144). Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, a previous Shah of Iran – relying on the principle of political survival – disapproved of consensus in foreign policy.…”

Section: The Impact Of Perceptual Environment On the Iranian Foreign mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Social-Identity Beliefs in the Trends of Foreign Policy of Iran

Shahidani

Penkovtsev

2017

Japanese Journal of Political Science

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Values and elements of popular culture play an important role in shaping and implementing the foreign policy of Iran. In this paper, using content analysis and after explaining the characteristics of Iranian identity, the author seeks to investigate the implications of Iranian social beliefs on foreign policy. In other words, the author sets out to explore whether the perceptions and attitudes of Iranian identity at different historical periods have been the basis according to which Iranian politicians have followed the same model or not? For this purpose, three major components, the influence in the regional area, xenophobia, and conspiracy theorythat are complementary in nature, have been selected. Research findings illustrate that the long history of societies like Iran has been the raison d'etre for the recurrence of social beliefs and values in various political eras of such societies.

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“…The Ahmadinejad election campaign of 2005 focused on domestic problems and promised a radical new direction for the country. When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became President on August 3, 2005, he came to power with a populist manifesto committed to dealing with unemployment, poverty, inflation, and corruption (Ehteshami and Zweiri 2007; Naji 2008). For example, one of his policies promised a $1.3 billion “Reza Love Fund” named after one of the Shia Imams (Ehteshami and Zweiri 2007).…”

Section: Domestic Politics and Iranian Diversionary Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became President on August 3, 2005, he came to power with a populist manifesto committed to dealing with unemployment, poverty, inflation, and corruption (Ehteshami and Zweiri 2007; Naji 2008). For example, one of his policies promised a $1.3 billion “Reza Love Fund” named after one of the Shia Imams (Ehteshami and Zweiri 2007). Ahmadinejad suggested that the fund could use some of Iran’s oil revenues to help young people get jobs, get married, and afford homes.…”

Section: Domestic Politics and Iranian Diversionary Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Iran has always had relatively high inflation rates, but one of the major policies of the Ahmadinejad administration had certainly exacerbated those pressures, resulting in an inflation rate of 24% as of January 2009 according to Iranian government statistics (Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran 2009). One of the areas where Ahmadinejad sought to improve living standards for the poor was to insist that the banks lend generously to ordinary citizens (Ehteshami and Zweiri 2007). While this policy has to be applauded as it sought to encourage the poor to contribute to the economy through micro‐investments, what in fact happened was that these loans were used for current consumption which in turn fueled inflation, which ate away at any of the real financial benefits that the poor received.…”

Section: Domestic Politics and Iranian Diversionary Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

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Coercive Diplomacy Meets Diversionary Incentives: The Impact of US and Iranian Domestic Politics during the Bush and Obama Presidencies1

Davies

2011

Foreign Policy Analysis

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Davies GAM. (2011) Coercive Diplomacy Meets Diversionary Incentives: The Impact of US and Iranian Domestic Politics during the Bush and Obama Presidencies. Foreign Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1111/j.1743‐8594.2011.00164.x This paper applies theories of strategic conflict avoidance and diversionary war to help explain US–Iranian interactions. The article argues that US attempts at coercive diplomacy have tended to strengthen hardliners in Iran by allowing them to frame opposition to government policies as support for the United States. In particular, US public uncertainty about the advisability of using force against Iran provided both the Supreme Leader and the Iranian President with an opportunity to increase tensions with the United States with little concern about provoking a military strike. The aggressive stance of the Iranian regime is about developing a threat which diverts attention from domestic problems and places it firmly in the arena of the international.

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Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives

Cited by 97 publications

References 0 publications

Populism, the International and Methodological Nationalism: Global Order and the Iran–Israel Nexus

Populism, the International and Methodological Nationalism: Global Order and the Iran–Israel Nexus

The Role of Social-Identity Beliefs in the Trends of Foreign Policy of Iran

Coercive Diplomacy Meets Diversionary Incentives: The Impact of US and Iranian Domestic Politics during the Bush and Obama Presidencies1

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