Iran’s Nontraditional Security Challenges under the Taliban Rule

Abstract

Strong historical, cultural, linguistic, and religious affinities have bound Iran and Afghanistan within the greater Middle East region. With the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban takeover in August 2021, Iran is likely to face the exacerbation of existing nontraditional security challenges and the emergence of new threats. Iran continues to deal with drug trafficking, an influx of refugees and economic migrants, and terrorism caused partly by more than four decades of war in Afghanistan. Although Iranian authorities have cheered the United States (US) pullout and expressed cautious optimism about the Taliban, Tehran's choice of policy toward Afghanistan and its new rulers remains to be decided. Iran is likely to continue a policy of engagement with the Taliban unless the government in Kabul realigns with Tehran's adversaries and poses security threats to Iran. In the latter situation, Iran, resorting to proxy sponsorship, is likely to model its Afghanistan policy on its Iraq policy.

Iran's Taliban problem revisited

“…Iran finds itself in a perilous situation after the August 2021 withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. Solhdoost and Pargoo (2022) survey several unconventional ways in which the resumption of Taliban rule directly threatens the security of the Islamic Republic. Sharp increases in the influx of narcotics and displaced persons seem likely to disrupt Iran's already shaky economic and social order.…”

“…Such perpetual antagonists of the Islamic Republic as the Pakistan‐based Army of God (Jundallah) and Army of Justice (Jaish ul‐Adl) are now joined by the stridently anti‐Shi'i movement known as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS‐K). Taken together, these three sources of danger—plus the prospect that the new leadership in Kabul might interrupt the cross‐border flow of water into Iran's parched eastern provinces—‘have [most certainly] complicated Iran's already precarious security problems in its eastern borders with Afghanistan’ (Solhdoost & Pargoo, 2022, p. 150).…”

“…Sharp increases in the influx of narcotics and displaced persons seem likely to disrupt Iran's already shaky economic and social order. In addition, the return of the Taliban may well transform Afghanistan into ‘a hotbed for anti‐Iran terrorist groups or even lead to an increase in the existing occasional low‐level insurgent activities inside Iran’ (Solhdoost & Pargoo, 2022, p. 148). Such perpetual antagonists of the Islamic Republic as the Pakistan‐based Army of God (Jundallah) and Army of Justice (Jaish ul‐Adl) are now joined by the stridently anti‐Shi'i movement known as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS‐K).…”

“…Solhdoost and Pargoo (2022, p. 148) point out that the Islamic Republic might respond by working more closely with international organisations. Alternatively, Tehran ‘could pursue a policy of engagement through both holding direct talks with the Taliban and collaborating with regional powers, such as Pakistan, China, and Russia, to ensure the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan does not jeopardise stability in the region’ (Solhdoost & Pargoo, 2022, p 149). Neither of these suggestions reflects an adequate grasp of the security dilemma with which policymakers must wrestle whenever they set out to manage pressing external dangers.…”

“…What scholarly analysts most often fail to recognise is the underlying dilemma that Iran confronts in deciding how to deal with such threats. Solhdoost and Pargoo (2022, p. 148) point out that the Islamic Republic might respond by working more closely with international organisations. Alternatively, Tehran ‘could pursue a policy of engagement through both holding direct talks with the Taliban and collaborating with regional powers, such as Pakistan, China, and Russia, to ensure the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan does not jeopardise stability in the region’ (Solhdoost & Pargoo, 2022, p 149).…”