“…The starting point is that it has become common to refer to proxy wars as "under-analyzed" (Mumford, 2013) or "underconceptualized" (Tamm, 2014). On the one hand, this contrasts with the exceptional growth of the literature which has moved from big picture analyses (Groh, 2019;Borghard, 2014;Mumford, 2013;Hughes 2012), to in-depth case studies of particular proxy wars, from Cold War staples like Angola and Nicaragua (Hoekstra, 2018(Hoekstra, , 2019, to contemporary ones such as Afghanistan (Akbarzadeh & Ibrahimi, 2020), India-Pakistan (Biberman, 2019), and Iran's Middle East proxy adventurism (Ahmadian & Mohseni, 2019;Ostovar, 2018). On the other hand, it ignores the fact that scholars have come to agree on a set of core features for proxy wars: the role of the proxy as a third party fighting a war using support provided by a state or a non-state actor; the latter's provision of support as an indirect intervention; and an essentially relational interaction between parties (Groh, 2019, p. 29;Rauta, 2018, p. 457;Sozer, 2016, p. 643;Mumford, 2013, p. 11;Hughes, 2012, p. 11).…”